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Abstract 
The purpose of this article is to analyze the application of 
the State secret privilege in litigations concerning cases of 
extraordinary renditions in Italy and the United States (US). The 
article addresses the decision of the Italian Constitutional Court in 
the Abu Omar case and compares it with the case law of US federal 
courts in the El-Masri case. It is argued, with several caveats, that a 
common pattern emerges in both Italy and the US, whenever a 
case of extraordinary rendition is either investigated in a criminal 
proceeding or claimed in a civil suit for the purpose of civil 
liability: if the government invokes the existence of a State secret 
privilege, the judiciary shows utmost deference to the 
determination of the executive branch, making it impossible for 
the individuals allegedly subjected to extraordinary renditions to 
obtain justice before domestic courts. The article therefore 
examines what role legislatures and supranational human rights 
institutions could play to reverse this troubling trend, by assessing 
the differences and the similarities existing between Italy and the 
US. Even though legislatures, both in parliamentary and 
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separation of powers systems, have proved either unwilling or 
unable to check the invocation of the privilege by the executive 
branch, the article suggests that the existence of judicial fora 
beyond the States, where individuals can bring their human rights 
claims, can be a valuable mechanism to ensure that allegations of 
extraordinary renditions are effectively adjudicated and redressed.  
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1. Introduction 
The purpose of this article is to analyze the application of 
the State secret privilege in litigations concerning cases of 
extraordinary renditions in Italy and the United States (US). 
Specifically, the article addresses the decision of the Corte 
Costituzionale (CCost), Italy’s Constitutional Court, in the Abu 
Omar case1 and places it in a broader constitutional perspective, by 
comparing it with the case law of US federal courts.2 On the basis 
of the comparative assessment, the article argues that a common 
pattern emerges both in Italy and the US, whenever a case of 
extraordinary rendition is either investigated in a criminal 
proceeding or claimed in a civil suit for the purpose of civil 
                                                 
1 C.Cost., sent. 106/2009, March 11, 2009 (published April 8, 2009). 
2 El-Masri v. Tenet, 437 F. Supp. 2d 530 (E.D. Va. 2006); aff’d by El-Masri v. US, 
479 F.3d 296 (4th Cir. 2007); cert. denied El-Masri v. US, 552 US 947 (2007). Cfr. 
also Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan Inc., 539 F. Supp. 2d 1128 (N.D. Ca. 2008); 
rev’d by Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan Inc., 536 F.3d 992 (9th Cir. 2009); aff’d by, 
En banc Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan Inc., 2010 US App. LEXIS 18746 (9th Cir. 
2010); cert. denied Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan Inc., 2011 U.S. LEXIS 3575. 
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liability: if the government invokes the existence of a State secret 
privilege, the judiciary shows utmost deference to the 
determination of the executive branch and proceeds either to a 
dismissal of the civil action or to an acquittal of the accused 
persons. The consequence of the application of the State secret 
privilege is, therefore, the impossibility for the individuals 
allegedly subjected to extraordinary renditions to obtain justice 
through redress before domestic courts. 
This troubling trend could be counteracted in a number of 
ways. The article will first investigate the role of legislatures in the 
oversight of the executive power and how the differences between 
a parliamentary and a separation of powers system may affect the 
capacity of the political branches to check and balance each other 
and prevent potential abuses in the use of the State secret 
privilege. As will be shown, however, the willingness and the 
ability of Parliament or Congress to counteract the increasing 
recourse by the executive to the State secret privilege seems weak 
in both the Italian and the US contexts. The article will therefore 
examine a second means of redress against the abuse of the State 
secret privilege: the role of supranational judicial institutions. 
Here, the divergence between the US and Italy appears significant: 
indeed, contrary to the US, Italy – as the other European countries 
– is subject to an external human rights scrutiny exercised by the 
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). Despite a number of 
caveats, it is argued that the existence of a multilevel system of 
human rights protection in Europe might prove effective and 
make the individuals adversely affected by human rights 
violations better off. 
The structure of the article is as follows. Section 2 examines 
in some detail the Abu Omar trial as an example of the post-9/11 
practice of extraordinary renditions and addresses the complex 
litigation on the applicability of the State secret privilege that has 
occurred before the Italian CCost. Section 3 takes into account the 
El-Masri case before the US courts and, by emphasizing the similar 
way in which Italian and US courts handle the questions raised by 
the executive’s assertion of a State secret privilege in cases of 
extraordinary renditions, develops an analytical framework on the 
role of the domestic judiciary. Section 4 evaluates the role of the 
legislatures in the US and Italy and compares their capacity to 
oversee the executive branch’s abuse of the State secret privilege. 
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Finally, section 5 considers the role of supranational judicial 
institutions and looks at some recent developments in the case law 
of the ECtHR that highlight the potentials of a multilevel system 
of human rights protection to remedy human rights violations 
produced by the practice of extraordinary renditions: the 
application lodged by Mr. El-Masri before the ECtHR will be 
reported as an example and compared with the less effective 
international mechanisms binding the US in the framework of the 
Inter-American human rights system. A brief conclusion follows. 
 
 
2. The Abu Omar case 
 One of the most contentious counter-terrorism policies 
utilized by the US administration in the post-9/11 era is a 
program known as ‘extraordinary rendition.’3 This program 
essentially consisted in the abduction of individuals suspected of 
being involved in terrorist plots or being part of terrorist networks 
and their secret transfer to detention facilities in third countries, in 
which constitutional and international standards of human rights 
                                                 
3 Cfr. Louis Fisher, Extraordinary Rendition: the Price of Secrecy, 57 Am. U.L. Rev. 
(2008) 1405, 1418 now reprinted in The Constitution and 9/11 (2008) ch. 10, who 
explains that the ‘extraordinary rendition’ program was inaugurated in 1995 – 
cfr. Presidential Decision Directive 39 (June 21, 1995) – but reached its apex in 
the post-9/11 epoch. Departing from the approach of the previous US 
Administration, the new US President has established a Special Inter-Agency 
Task Force “to study and evaluate the practices of transferring individuals to 
other nations in order to ensure that such practices comply with the domestic 
laws, international obligations, and policies of the United States and do not 
result in the transfer of individuals to other nations to face torture or otherwise 
for the purpose, or with the effect, of undermining or circumventing the 
commitments or obligations of the United States to ensure the humane 
treatment of individuals in its custody or control.” (Exec. Order  No. 13,491, 74 
Fed. Reg. 4893 (Jan. 22, 2009) ‘Ensuring Lawful Interrogations’ Sec. 5 (e)(ii)). The 
Special Task Force then issued its recommendations to the US President 
advising that transfer practices comply with applicable legal requirements and 
do not result in the transfer of persons to face torture. The Task Force supported 
the continued use of assurances from a receiving country that an individual 
would not face torture if transferred there but requested strengthened 
mechanism to obtain, evaluate and monitor these assurances. (Dept. of Just., 
Press release 09-835, Aug. 24, 2009 available at: 
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2009/August/09-ag-835.html (last accessed 
June 10, 2011)). 
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protection do not apply, for the purpose of being interrogated.4 
One such individual was Mr. Osama Mustafa Hassan Nasr (alias 
Abu Omar), an Egyptian-born Muslim cleric living in Milan 
(Italy). The Italian police was already investigating the possible 
involvement of Mr. Abu Omar with radical Islamist groups, when, 
on 12 February 2003 Mr. Abu Omar was secretly kidnapped by a 
group of Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) operatives with the 
support of Italian security and intelligence officers and transferred 
to Egypt where he was detained for several month for 
interrogation purposes and allegedly subjected to torture and 
inhuman and degrading treatments.5  
 Soon afterwards, the Office of the public prosecutor in 
Milan opened a criminal investigation for the crime of abduction 
of Mr. Abu Omar and began an inquiry to identify the persons 
responsible for the crime.6 It ought to be highlighted that in the 
Italian constitutional system, contrary to what occurs in the US, 
public prosecutors do not depend on the executive branch but 
enjoy the same wide autonomy and independence of ordinary 
                                                 
4 For a strong criticism of the use of ‘extraordinary renditions’ in the war on 
terror on human rights grounds cfr. Margaret Satterthwaite, Rendered 
Meaningless: Extraordinary Rendition and the Rule of Law, 75 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 
(2006) 1333 an the report of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York 
& Center for Human Rights and Global Justice, Torture by Proxy: International 
and Domestic Law Applicable to “Extraordinary Renditions” (2004). The practice of 
extraordinary rendition has come under fire also by multiple international 
institutions. Cfr. the Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee 
established under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 
Report on the USA, CCPR/C/USA/CO/3/Rev.1 Dec. 18, 2006; the Final Report 
of the European Parliament, Alleged Use of European Countries by the CIA for the 
Transportation and Illegal Detention of Prisoners, Eur. Parl. Doc. A6-0020/2007, 
Jan. 30, 2007; and the two Reports written by Dick Marty for the Committee on 
Legal Affairs and Human Rights of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council 
of Europe, Alleged Secret Detentions in Council of Europe Member States, AS/Jur 
(2006) 03, Jan. 22, 2006 and Secret Detentions and Illegal Transfers of Detainees 
Involving Council of Europe Member States, AS/Jur (2007) 36, June 7, 2007. 
5 For an account of the facts involving Mr. Abu Omar and for an overview of 
the judicial proceedings that followed cfr. Tommaso F. Giupponi, Stato di diritto 
e attività di intelligence: gli interrogativi del caso Abu Omar, Quaderni 
Costituzionali (2006) 810; Francesco Messineo, “Extraordinary Renditions” and 
State Obligations to Criminalize and Prosecute Torture in the Light of the Abu Omar 
Case in Italy, 7 J. Int’l Crim. J. (2009), 1023. 
6 Cfr. Penal code It., Art. 605 (criminalizing abduction) and Art. 289-bis 
(criminalizing abduction for terrorist purposes). 
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judges. Indeed, both prosecutors and judges are civil servants, 
hired through public examinations, and are subject only to the 
disciplinary rules adopted by the Consiglio Superiore della 
Magistratura (Supreme Council of the Judiciary), i.e. the body 
representing the judiciary as an autonomous and independent 
branch of government.7 In addition, in reaction to the practice of 
the Fascist period, the 1948 Constitution decided to remove from 
the executive’s discretion any decision regarding crimes to 
investigated and codified instead an opposing rule:8 Art. 112 of 
the Constitution affirms that “the public prosecutor has the duty 
to initiate criminal proceedings” whenever he has been informed 
that a crime has been committed.9  
 During its investigations between 2005 and 2006, the Office 
of the public prosecutor gathered a large amount of evidence 
concerning the involvement of CIA operatives and Italian 
intelligence and security officers in the abduction of Mr. Abu 
Omar. At that time, moreover, the government neither attempted 
to prevent the inquiry nor formally invoked any State secret 
privilege.10 This eventually led, on 5 December 2006, to the official 
indictment of 26 US and 9 Italian citizens. According to the 
adversarial system introduced in Italy by the 1988 Code of 
                                                 
7 For a comparison of the organization of the judicial branch in Italy and the US 
and for an assessment of the role and functions of the Supreme Council of the 
Judiciary in Italy cfr. Alessandro Pizzorusso, Italian and American Models of the 
Judiciary and of Judicial Review of Legislation: A Comparison of Recent Tendencies, 38 
Am. J. Comp. L. (1990), 373 and Carlo Guarnieri & Patrizia Pederzoli, The Power 
of Judges: A Comparative Study of Courts and Democracy (2002). 
8 Cfr. Mario Chiavario, Diritto Processuale Penale. Profilo Istituzionale (2005). For a 
comparison between the European legal systems establishing a principle of 
prosecutorial discretion and those with a constitutionalized duty to prosecute 
any notitia criminis cfr. Luca Luparia, Obbligatorietà e discrezionalità dell’azione 
penale nel quadro comparativo europeo, Giurisprudenza Italiana (2002), 1751. 
9 Const. It., Art. 112. (A translation of the Italian Constitution by Carlo Fusaro is 
available in English at the International Constitutional Law web site: 
http://www.servat.unibe.ch/icl/it__indx.html (last accessed June 10, 2011)). 
10 At the time of the investigations the government (headed from 2001 to 2006 
by Prime Minister Berlusconi) did not formally invoke the State secret privilege. 
Nevertheless, in a confidential letter to the prosecutors it cautioned about the 
existence of reasons of national security concerning the relationship between 
the SISMI and the CIA. This was later interpreted by the new government 
(headed from 2006 to 2008 by Prime Minister Prodi) as implying the assertion of 
a State secret privilege. Cfr. infra text accompanying nt. 14 & 22. 
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criminal procedure,11 it is the duty of the public prosecutor to 
carry out criminal investigations and afterwards to formulate an 
indictment of the allegedly responsible persons, requesting that 
they be subjected to criminal trial.12 The decision whether to open 
the criminal trial is, however, made in a public hearing, in the 
presence of the indicted persons, by a third independent 
magistrate, the giudice dell’udienza preliminare (gup) – i.e. the judge 
of the preliminary hearing, who evaluates the request of the public 
prosecutor on the basis of the evidence the latter collected during 
his investigations.13 The gup of Milan decided to open the criminal 
trial at the preliminary hearing of 16 February 2007. 
 When the preliminary hearing was still pending in Milan, 
however, on 14 February 2007, the Presidente del Consiglio, Italy’s 
Prime Minister (from Spring 2006, Mr. Prodi) commenced legal 
proceedings before the CCost against the Office of the public 
prosecutor of Milan, complaining that the investigations in the 
Abu Omar case had violated a State secret privilege regarding the 
relationship between the Italian military intelligence (SISMI)14 and 
its foreign counterparts, and requesting the CCost to declare 
invalid all evidence gathered by the prosecutors.15 Indeed, the 
Italian Constitution, instead of introducing a decentralized US-
style system of judicial review, created a specialized judicial body, 
the CCost, on the Kelsenian model, to review the constitutionality 
                                                 
11 For an introduction to the Italian Code of criminal procedure in English cfr. 
William Pizzi & Luca Marafioti, The New Italian Code of Criminal Procedure: The 
Difficulties of Building an Adversarial Trial System on a Civil Law Foundation, 17 
Yale J. Int’l L. (1992), 2; Elisabetta Grande, Italian Criminal Justice: Borrowing and 
Resistance, 48 Am. J. Comp. L. (2000), 227. 
12 Cfr. Code of criminal procedure It., Art. 405 (request of the indictment by the 
Office of the public prosecutors). 
13 Cfr. Code of criminal procedure It., Art. 424 juncto Art. 429 (decision of the 
gup whether to open the criminal trial). 
14 The SISMI, established under Law 801/1977, was the Italian military 
intelligence agency involved in counter-proliferation activities and in all 
counter-intelligence operations taking place outside the national territory. Since 
the enactment of Law 124/2007 the SISMI has been replaced by the AISE. For 
an introduction to the organization and the functions of the Italian intelligence 
apparatus cfr. Tommaso F. Giupponi & Federico Fabbrini, Intelligence Agencies 
and the State Secret Privilege: the Italian Experience, 4 Int’l J. Const. Law 3 (2010), 
443. 
15 Reg. C. 2/2007. 
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of legislation.16 The CCost, however, was granted also additional 
functions,17 among which, especially, the power to umpire 
“conflicts of allocation of powers” between the branches of 
government.18 Accordingly, any institution which alleges that one 
of its prerogatives has been unlawfully abridged by another 
branch, or that another branch has wrongly exercised the 
competences with which it was rightly endowed, can recur to the 
CCost to vindicate its powers.19 
  After the gup’s decision on 16 February 2007 to open a 
criminal trial against the CIA and SISMI agents, the Prime 
Minister brought, on 14 March 2007, a new action for the 
allocation of powers before the CCost against the gup, claiming 
that its decision to open the criminal trial was based on evidence 
collected in violation of the State secret privilege and was, as such, 
void.20 Both ‘conflicts of allocations of powers’ were declared 
                                                 
16 Cfr. in general Mauro Cappelletti, Il controllo giudiziario di costituzionalità 
delle leggi nel diritto comparato (1972) and Norman Dorsen, Michel Rosenfeld, 
Andras Sajo & Susan Baer, Comparative Constitutionalism. Cases and Materials 
(2003), ch. 2. On the kelsenian model of constitutional review cfr. specifically 
Theo Öhlinger, The Genesis of the Austrian Model of Constitutional Review of 
Legislation, 16 Ratio Juris 2 (2003), 206. 
17 For an introduction to Italian CCost cfr. Gustavo Zagrebelsky, La giurisdizione 
costituzionale, in Manuale di diritto pubblico (Giuliano Amato & Augusto Barbera 
eds. 1991, 3rd ed.), 657; and Tania Groppi, The Constitutional Court of Italy: 
Towards a Multilevel System of Constitutional Review?, 3 J. Comp. L. (2008), 100. 
18 Cfr. Const. It., Art. 134 (functions of the CCost). 
19 On the role of the Italian CCost in umpiring conflicts of allocation of powers 
cfr. Augusto Cerri, Poteri dello Stato (Conflitto tra i), in Enciclopedia Giuridica 
Treccani, vol. XXIII (1991) ad vocem. When the CCost is called upon to decide on 
a conflict of allocation of powers it shall first decide whether the action is prima 
facie admissible. A conflict of allocation is admissible if: a) the subjects of the 
proceedings, i.e. both parties, can be considered as ‘powers of the State’; b) the 
object of the controversy has to do with a delimitation of constitutionally 
attributed powers. The CCost, in its case law, has been willing to interpret quite 
widely both criteria. Cfr. e.g. C.Cost. sent. 48/1998, Feb. 25, 1998 (published 
March 11, 1998) (holding that a conflict raised by the Parliamentary Committee 
for the control of the public broadcast channel is admissible), C.Cost. sent. 
457/1999, Dec. 14, 1999 (published Dec. 29, 1999) (holding that the conflict of 
allocation is admissible to protect the constitutionally determined sphere of 
attribution of each branch from any legal measure that can be adopted by other 
branches). If a conflict is declared admissible the CCost will then, with a 
separate decision, rule on the merit. Cfr. also Antonio Ruggeri & Antonio 
Spadaro, Lineamenti di Giustizia Costituzionale (2005). 
20 Reg. C. 3/2007. 
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prima facie admissible by the CCost on 18 April 2007.21 In June, 
then, reacting to the initiative of the government, the Office of the 
public prosecutor of Milan also commenced proceedings before 
the CCost against the Prime Minister, complaining about the 
violation of its constitutional prerogatives and claiming that the 
position of the government had been inconsistent, since the State 
secret privilege had not been formally invoked by the executive 
during the investigations and had only been asserted lately.22 The 
CCost also admitted prima facie this case and proceeded to a joint 
assessment of it with the previous two.23  
 In the meanwhile, however, the criminal trial in Milan had 
been moving on and the judge of the IV Criminal Division of the 
Tribunal of Milan in charge of the case had proceeded to the cross-
examination phase, summoning witnesses and acquiring other 
evidence. Because of this, the new Prime Minister (from Spring 
2008, Mr. Berlusconi) on 30 May 2008 commenced proceedings 
before the CCost against the Tribunal of Milan, claiming that the 
advancement of the trial while a decision on the State secrecy 
privilege was still pending before the CCost infringed the 
constitutional prerogatives of the executive branch.24 On 13 
December 2008, then, the Tribunal of Milan suspended the 
ongoing  trial and brought proceeding against the Prime Minister 
before the CCost.25 In his brief, the judge of Milan recalled that the 
officers of the SISMI who were accused in the trial had expressed 
their impossibility of presenting relevant evidence in their defence 
because of the existence of a State secret privilege and underlined 
how the Chief executive had confirmed the assertion of such a 
privilege. He therefore complained that the State secret privilege 
                                                 
21 C.Cost., ord. 124/2007, April 18, 2007 (published April 26, 2007); C.Cost., ord. 
125/2007, April 18, 2007 (published April 26, 2007). 
22 Reg. C. 6/2007. 
23 C.Cost., ord. 337/2007, Sept. 26, 2007 (published Oct. 3, 2007). 
24 Reg. C. 14/2008. The CCost declared the conflict for allocation of powers 
prima facie admissible on June 25, 2008: Cfr. C.Cost., ord. 230/2008, June 25, 2008 
(published July 2, 2008). 
25 Reg. C. 20/2008. The CCost declared the conflict for allocation of powers 
prima facie admissible on Dec. 17, 2008: Cfr C.Cost., ord. 425/2008, Dec. 17, 2008 
(published Dec. 24, 2008). 
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de facto made impossible for the court to issue a decision on the 
criminal liability of the accused persons.26 
Eventually, after joining the unprecedented number of five 
‘conflicts of allocation of powers’, all raised in the context of the 
same criminal case, the CCost on 11 March 2009 delivered its 
decision. The CCost began its opinion stating that the purpose of 
its ruling was – as typical of a ruling umpiring ‘conflicts of 
allocation of powers’ between branches of government – to clarify 
“the respective ambits of constitutional attributions that may be 
legitimately exercised, on the one hand, by the Prime Minister 
and, on the other, by the several judicial authorities involved in 
the investigation and the trial”27 of Mr. Abu Omar (i.e. separately, 
the Office of the public prosecutor, the gup and the trial judge of 
Milan). Specifically, the focus of the decision was whether the 
Chief executive could invoke a State secret privilege (concealing 
all the relationships between the SISMI and the CIA) and thus 
prevent the judiciary from investigating and prosecuting the 
individuals allegedly involved in the abduction and extraordinary 
rendition of Mr. Abu Omar. 
In the Italian legal system, the discipline of the State secret 
privilege is provided by statute.28 A recent act of Parliament, Law 
124/2007 – whose principles, however, are in continuity with 
                                                 
26 The situation that took place in the Abu Omar trial should not be confused 
with the rules in force in the US under the Classified Information Procedure Act 
(CIPA) – P.L. 96-456 codified at 18 U.S.C. App. III. – i.e. the Congressional act 
regulating the operation of the State secret privilege in the criminal context. 
CIPA, indeed, operates when the executive branch wants to prosecute ad 
individual and, at the same time, wants to preserve the secrecy of several 
information, thus limiting the defendant’s rights to confront witnesses and 
present evidence in his defence. In the case at hand, instead, the problem was 
different. It has already been highlighted in text accompanying supra nt. 7 that 
in the Italian legal system prosecutors are independent from the executive 
branch: in the case at hand, therefore, the State secret privilege was not invoked 
by the Office of the public prosecutors but rather by the defendants (shielded 
by the government) in order to avoid the disclosure in court of the evidence 
collected by the prosecutors.  
27 C.Cost., sent. 106/2009, March 11, 2009 (published April 8, 2009), cons. dir., §3. 
28 For a detailed account of the Law 124/2007 cfr. Giupponi & Fabbrini (supra 
note 14). For a more general overview of the role of the State secret privilege in 
Italian constitutional politics cfr. instead Andrea Morrone, Il nomos del segreto di 
Stato, tra politica e Costituzione, Forum Quaderni Costituzionali (2008). 
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those of the previous legislation dating to the 1970s29 – affirms that 
a State secret privilege can be asserted to protect “the acts, the 
documents, the information, the activities, and all other things, 
whose knowledge or circulation can damage the integrity of the 
Republic, even in relation with international agreements, the 
defence of the institutions established by the Constitution, the 
independence of the State vis-à-vis other States and in its 
relationship with them and the preparation and military defence 
of the State.”30 The Chief executive is the only authority entitled to 
assert the State secret privilege31 and classification cannot last for 
more than 30 years.32 The invocation of the privilege “inhibits 
judicial inquiry.”33 However, to balance the need of national 
security with the rule of law, Law 124/2007 provides that when a 
judge is dissatisfied with the executive’s assertion of the privilege 
it can raise a ‘formal appeal’ to the Prime Minister, asking for the 
removal of the privilege and can, subsequently, bring an action for 
allocation of powers before the CCost.34 
The judgment of the CCost began with a detailed 
explanation of the facts of the case and with a long reassessment of 
the precedents of the CCost regarding the State secret privilege.35 
The CCost restated its view that the State secret privilege 
“represents a preeminent interest in any legal system, whatever its 
political regime”36 and that the executive branch enjoys a “wide 
discretion”37 in deciding whether to classify a piece of information 
                                                 
29 C.Cost. sent. 106/2009, cons. dir., §4. The previous discipline of the State secret 
privilege was provided by Law 801/1977. For an overview of the continuities 
and discontinuities between the two regimes cfr. Giulio M. Salerno, Il segreto di 
Stato tra conferme e novità, Percorsi costituzionali (2008), 66. 
30 Law 124/2007, Art. 39(1). 
31 Law 124/2007, Art. 39(4) (power of the Prime Minister to assert the privilege). 
32 Law 124/2007, Art. 39(8) (expiration of the privilege after 30 years). 
33 Law 124/2007, Art. 41(5). 
34 Cfr. Law 124/2007, Art.s 41(1) and 41(7) (possibility for the judiciary to ask 
the government whether it has formally asserted the privilege and to contest 
this decision by raising a ‘conflict of attribution’ before the CCost). 
35 For an introduction to the precedents of the CCost in the field of the State 
secret privilege cfr. Carlo Bonzano, Il segreto di Stato nel processo penale 
(2010), ch. 1 and Alessandro Pace, L’apposizione del segreto di Stato nei principi 
costituzionali e nella legge 124/2007, Giurisprudenza Costituzionale (2008), 4047. 
36 C.Cost. sent. 106/2009, cons. dir., §3 quoting C.Cost. sent. 86/1977, May 24, 
1977 (published June 1, 1977). 
37 C.Cost. sent. 106/2009, cons. dir., §3 quoting C.Cost. sent. 86/1977. 
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as a State secret. The CCost consequently affirmed that the 
judiciary “cannot scrutinize the ‘an’ [if] or the ‘quomodo’ [how] of 
the decision of the executive to seal an information as a State 
secret, because the choice on the necessary and appropriate means 
to ensure national security is a political one – belonging as such to 
the executive branch and not to the ordinary judiciary.”38 At the 
same time, however, the CCost reaffirmed its role “in the case of a 
conflict of allocation between branches of government.”39 From 
this statement it seemed therefore to follow that the CCost enjoyed 
a full and unrestrained power to scrutinize the decision of the 
executive branch to assert the existence of a privilege. 
In the holding, the CCost mainly upheld the requests of the 
Prime Minister, affirming that the Office of the public prosecutor 
and, subsequently, the gup and the Tribunal of Milan had 
infringed upon the prerogative of the executive branch.40 
Although at the start of the investigations the Prime Minister had 
not asserted reasons of national security, once the State secret 
privilege was sealed on the documents concerning the relationship 
between the Italian intelligence agencies and the CIA, the public 
prosecutors were prevented from using this evidence to formalize 
the indictment; the gup could not ground on them in its decision 
to open a criminal trial; and the judge should not have admitted 
the examination of witnesses on this account. The CCost, instead, 
affirmed that the Tribunal of Milan could not be criticized by the 
Prime Minister for the advancement of the trial.41 And it also 
rejected the action brought by the prosecutors, affirming that, in 
fact, no violations of their constitutional prerogatives had 
occurred, since the Prime Minister had not obstructed their 
investigation concerning the crime of abduction of Mr. Abu 
Omar.42 
Equally, in the ratio decidendi of its ruling, the CCost 
rejected the conflict of allocation of powers raised by the Tribunal 
of Milan, who complained that the Prime Minister’s assertion of a 
State secret privilege was over-broad and prevented the judiciary 
from undertaking its constitutional duty to investigate crimes and 
                                                 
38 C.Cost. sent. 106/2009, cons. dir., §3 quoting C.Cost. sent. 86/1977. 
39 C.Cost. sent. 106/2009, cons. dir., §3. 
40 Id., §8. 
41 Id., §11. 
42 Id., §6.1. 
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provide justice.43 After clarifying that the State secret “does not 
concern the crime of abduction ‘ex se’ [in itself] – which can 
therefore be investigated by the judicial authority – but rather, on 
the one hand, the relationship between the Italian intelligence 
services and the foreign agencies and, on the other, the 
organizational structure and the operative functions of the [Italian 
intelligence]”44, the CCost forcefully affirmed that “any judicial 
review on the decision to invoke a State secret privilege has to be 
excluded.”45 According to the CCost, the precedents and the 
legislation made it clear that the Prime Minister was entitled to a 
wide discretion in this field, and could not be subject to the 
scrutiny of ordinary courts. 
With a deferential move, however, the CCost also abdicated 
its constitutional role in reviewing the action of the executive 
branch even in the context of a conflict of ‘allocation of powers’:46 
In the words of the CCost, in fact, “the judgment on what means 
are considered as most appropriate or simply useful to ensure the 
security of the State belongs to the Prime Minister under the 
control of Parliament.”47 According to the CCost, its only task was 
that of checking “the existence or inexistence of the conditions that 
justify the invocation of the State secret privilege, but not to judge 
on the merits of the reasons that prompted its invocation.”48 By 
bowing to the autonomous evaluation of the government, under 
the control of Parliament, and by restricting its review to an 
external oversight of the respect of the procedures provided by the 
law, the CCost embraced a “kind of political question doctrine.”49 
As a consequence of its decision indeed, once the executive branch 
invokes the State secret privilege in court, this “effectively bars the 
judiciary”50 from continuing its investigation and prosecutions 
                                                 
43 Id., §12. 
44 Id., §12.3. 
45 Id., §12.4. 
46 Cfr. Tommaso F. Giupponi, Servizi di informazione e segreto di Stato nella legge n. 
124/2007, Forum Quaderni Costituzionali (2009), 46; Adele Anzon, Il segreto di 
Stato ancora una volta tra Presidente del Consiglio, autorità giudiziaria e Corte 
costituzionale, Giurisprudenza costituzionale (2009), 1020. 
47 C.Cost. sent. 106/2009, cons. dir., §12.4. 
48 Id. 
49 Giupponi (cit. at 46), 47. 
50 C. Cost., sent. 106/2009, cons. dir. §4. 
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and no scrutiny on the decision of the Prime Minister can be 
exercised even by the CCost.51 
After the decision of the CCost, in April 2009 the criminal 
trial restarted in Milan: on the basis of the ruling of the CCost, 
however, the prosecutors and the judge were not allowed to use 
the evidence concerning the relationship between the SISMI and 
the CIA, regarded by the executive branch as a State secret. De 
facto, the existence of a State privilege represented an 
insurmountable hurdle that significantly shaped the outcome of 
the trial.52 When on 4 November 2009 the judge read his 
decision,53 he condemned 23 CIA agents of US nationality for the 
crime of abduction of Mr. Abu Omar, sanctioning them from three 
to five years imprisonment; he acquitted three US citizens for 
reasons of diplomatic immunity; and was forced to dismiss the 
indictment against all the Italian defendants (agents of the SISMI) 
since the existence of a State secret privilege prevented the 
assessment of their co-responsibility in the crime. As the US had 
already made clear that it would not extradite its officers to Italy,54 
however, not a single individual will be subject to criminal 
sanctions for the extraordinary rendition of Mr. Abu Omar.55 
                                                 
51 Cfr. the critical remarks of Fabrizio Ramacci, Segreto di Stato, salus rei publicae 
e “sbarramento” ai p.m., Giurisprudenza costituzionale (2009), 1015 and Giovanni 
Salvi, La Corte e il segreto di Stato, Cassazione Penale (2009) 3729. 
52 Messineo (supra note 5), 1043. Cfr. also Giovanni Bianconi, Il processo 
dimezzato dalla mannaia del segreto di Stato, Il Corriere della Sera, Oct. 1, 2009, at 
27; Antonio Tarasco, Il Caso Abu Omar e l’eccesso di motivazione dell’atto 
giudiziario: dei diversi modi di straripamento del potere, Corriere Giuridico 6 (2010), 
827.  
53 Trib. Milano, IV sez. pen.., Nov. 4, 2009 (published Feb. 1, 2010).  
54 At this day, the Italian Ministry of Justice has not forwarded any official 
request of extradition of the accused and convicted persons to the US. The US 
Dept. of State, however, had already made clear on Feb. 28, 2007 that, if 
requested, it would not extradite its citizens to Italy for trial or punishment. Cfr. 
Craig Whitlock, US Won’t Send CIA Defendants to Italy: Abduction Probes Hurt 
Anti-Terrorism Efforts, State Dept. Official Says, The Washington Post, March 1, 
2007. On the problem of judicial immunity for foreign intelligence agents cfr. 
Paola Gaeta, Extraordinary renditions e immunità dalla giurisdizione penale degli 
agenti di Stati esteri: il caso Abu Omar, Rivista di Diritto Internazionale (2006) 
126. 
55 Of course, the fact that, in any case, the Abu Omar prosecution has eventually 
led to the condemnation of 23 CIA agents for their involvement in the unlawful 
abduction and secret rendition of Mr. Abu Omar, can be regarded as a positive 
step in the re-establishment of the rule of law in the post-9/11 era. Cfr. David 
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The decision of the Tribunal of Milan has been appealed 
both by the defendant and by the Office of the public prosecutor,56 
and is now pending before the Criminal Division of the Appeal 
Court of Milan. In light of the broad recognition of the State secret 
privilege offered in a final and binding decision by the CCost, 
however, it is unlikely that overhauls will take place on appeal.57 
Indeed, the decision of the CCost to acknowledge a wide 
discretion to the executive branch in invoking the State secret 
privilege to prevent the disclosure of information regarding the 
organization of the Italian intelligence agencies and its 
relationship with foreign agencies (namely, the CIA) – without 
any possibility of judicial review on the legitimacy of the Prime 
Minister’s decision to classify a piece of information as a State 
secret – jeopardizes the ability of the judiciary to perform its task 
and forecloses the possibility for the individuals subjected to 
extraordinary renditions to obtain a remedy before domestic 
courts.58 The position of the Italian judiciary, however, is not 
unique on the international scene.  
 
 
 3. The El-Masri case. 
 In the past years, a number of cases concerning the policy of 
extraordinary renditions have been litigated in several 
                                                                                                                       
Cole, Getting Away With Torture, N.Y. Rev. of Books 1 (2010), 39. The fact that 
nobody will be really punished for the wrongdoing, however, is problematic 
and unsatisfactory from a human rights perspective. 
56 Cfr. Biagio Marsiglia, Abu Omar, appello della Procura: “Il segreto di Stato? 
Ambiguo”, Il Corriere della Sera, March 20, 2010. 
57 Messineo (cit. at 5), 1043. 
58 According to the Code of criminal procedure It., Art. 74, natural persons who 
have suffered a damage from a crime, can bring a civil action in tort against the 
responsible person or, alternatively, can join the criminal proceedings activated 
by the Office of the public prosecutor against the indicted persons. In this case, 
the trial judge, beside being responsible of ascertaining the criminal liabilities, 
can also award pecuniary damages to the victim of a crime. The decision of the 
trial judge on the issue of civil liability is however determined by its ruling on 
the question of criminal responsibility. Mr. Abu Omar had joined the criminal 
proceedings activated by the Office of the public prosecutor of Milan. Because 
of the application of the State secret privilege, he will be unable to claim 
damages from the Italian intelligence officers who allegedly cooperated in its 
abduction and extraordinary rendition. 
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jurisdictions around the world.59 This confirms a trend by which 
counter-terrorism strategies adopted in the aftermath of 9/11 have 
been increasingly subjected to judicial scrutiny to ensure 
compatibility with principles of fundamental rights.60 
Nevertheless, while the judiciary, both in the US and Europe, has 
reaffirmed its role in reviewing the action of the political branches 
e.g. on the issues of indefinite detention and economic sanctions 
against suspected terrorists,61 its involvement in the field of 
extraordinary renditions and State secrecy has been much less 
spectacular so far. Limiting the assessment to only those cases that 
took place before US federal courts in which litigation about 
extraordinary renditions was interwoven with the executive 
branch claim of a State secret privilege,62 I will consider in 
                                                 
59 For a general and updated overview of litigation of cases of extraordinary 
renditions in the US cfr. Louis Fisher, The American Constitution at the End of the 
Bush Presidency, in Developments in American Politics (Bruce Cain et al. eds., 
2010), 238, 249 ff who also highlights how criminal investigations of cases of 
extraordinary renditions had been activated in a number of European States 
(beside Italy cfr.: Denmark, Germany, Ireland, Norway, Sweden) and are 
currently pending in Spain. Civil proceedings have advanced, unsuccessfully, 
also in the United Kingdom. Cfr: Mohamed v. Secretary of State [2008] EWHC 
2048 (Admin.); aff’d by Mohamed v. Secretary of State [2009] EWHC 152 (Admin.) 
on which see Sudha Setty, Litigating Secrets: Comparative Perspective on the State 
Secret Privilege, 75 Brooklyn L. Rev. (2009) 201, 240. 
60 Cfr. Federico Fabbrini, The Role of the Judiciary in Times of Emergency: Judicial 
Review of Counter-Terrorism Measures in the United States Supreme Court and the 
European Court of Justice, 28 Yearbook Eur. L. (2009), 664. 
61 Cfr. e.g. Lakhdar Boumediene et al. v. George W. Bush et al. 553 US 723 (2008) (on 
the constitutional rights to habeas corpus for aliens detained as enemy 
combatants in Guantanamo); European Court of Justice, Joined Cases C-402/05 
P & C-415/05 P Yassin A. Kadi & Al Barakaat International Foundation v. EU 
Council and Commission judgment of 3 September 2008, nyr (on the fundamental 
right to due process and fair proceeding for the individuals and entities 
targeted by United Nations counter-terrorism sanctions aiming at freezing their 
financial properties) – on which see David Cole, Rights Over Borders: 
Transnational Constitutionalism and Guantanamo Bay, Cato Supreme Court Rev. 
(2008), 47 and Giacinto Della Cananea, Global Security and Procedural Due Process 
of Law Between the United Nations and the European Union: Kadi & Al Barakaat, 15 
Columbia J. Eur. L. (2009), 519. 
62 Other cases in which plaintiffs brought civil proceedings claiming damages 
for their subjection to extraordinary rendition and in which the US government 
sought dismissal of the suit by invocation of the State secret privilege have been 
resolved in favour of the government on other grounds. Cfr. Arar v. Ashcroft 414 
F. Supp. 2d 250 (E.D.N.Y. 2006); aff’d by Arar v. Ashcroft 532 F. 3d 157 (2d Cir. 
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particular the El-Masri case,63 as a meaningful comparative 
example of a trans-Atlantic pattern of judicial retreat in the face of 
the invocation by the government of the State secret privilege for 
reasons of national security.  
Mr. Khaled El-Masri, a German citizen of Lebanese descent, 
was seized, under suspicion of being a terrorist, by the 
Macedonian authorities on the 31 December 2003 and rendered to 
the US intelligence, who secretly transferred him to Afghanistan. 
There, he was detained incommunicado for several months and 
allegedly tortured and subjected to inhumane and degrading 
treatment. In May 2004, however, the CIA apparently came to the 
conclusion that there had been a mistake of identity and that it 
was detaining an innocent man. Mr. El-Masri was therefore flown 
back to Europe and allegedly abandoned on the side of an 
Albanian road. 64 On 6 December 2005, Mr. El-Masri filed a civil 
case in the US federal District Court for the Eastern District of 
Virginia, suing the former director of the CIA, certain unknown 
agents of the CIA and the corporations owning the private jets 
with which the CIA had operated his extraordinary rendition to 
and from Afghanistan as well as their personnel.65 As already 
underlined, since in the US prosecutors are embedded in the 
executive branch, it is mainly through actions in tort like the one 
brought by Mr. El-Masri that practices such as the CIA 
extraordinary renditions program can be subject to judicial 
scrutiny.66 
                                                                                                                       
2008); aff’d by, En banc Arar v. Ashcroft US App. LEXIS 23988 (2d Cir. 2009); cert. 
denied by Arar v. Ashcroft 130 S. Ct. 3409 (2009). 
63 El-Masri v. Tenet, 437 F. Supp. 2d 530 (E.D. Va. 2006); aff’d by El-Masri v. US 
479 F.3d 296 (4th Cir. 2007); cert. denied El-Masri v. US 552 US 947 (2007).  But 
cfr. also Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan Inc., 539 F. Supp. 2d 1128 (N.D. Ca. 2008); 
rev’d by Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan Inc., 536 F.3d 992 (9th Cir. 2009); aff’d by, 
En banc Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan Inc., 2010 US App. LEXIS 18746 (9th Cir. 
2010); cert. denied Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan Inc., 2011 U.S. LEXIS 3575. 
64 For an account of the facts involving Mr. El-Masri and for an overview of the 
judicial proceedings that followed cfr. Fisher (supra note 3), 1442; Daniel 
Huyck, Fade to Black: El-Masri v. United States Validates the Use of the State Secret 
Privilege to Dismiss “Extraordinary Renditions” Claims, 17 Minn. J. Int’l L. (2005), 
435. 
65 Cfr. Complaint, El-Masri v. Tenet, No. 05-cv-1417 (E.D. Va) (available at: 
http://www.aclu.org/files/safefree/rendition/asset_upload_file829_22211.pdf 
(last accessed June 10, 2011)).  
66 Cfr. text accompanying supra nt. 7. 
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Mr. El-Masri asserted three separate causes of action. To 
begin with, he claimed violations of his constitutional rights of 
due process as recognized in the V Amendment to the US 
Constitution.67 In addition, he asserted a violation of the 
international legal norms prohibiting prolonged arbitrary 
detention as well as those prohibiting cruel, inhuman and 
degrading treatment – as incorporated in US law through the 
Alien Tort Statute (ATS). The ATS – a provision originally codified 
in the 1789 Judiciary Act68 – has been interpreted as granting 
federal courts jurisdiction over lawsuits brought by aliens seeking 
damages for violations of norms of customary international law,69 
since the decision of the US Court of Appeal for the Second Circuit 
in Filartiga v. Peña-Irala.70 The Supreme Court, despite clarifying 
that only a limited set of international norms can be justiciable 
under the ATS, has substantially confirmed this construction in 
Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain71 – hence making the ATS an effective 
mechanism to review violations of peremptory norms of 
international human rights law,72 such as the one alleged by Mr. 
El-Masri. 
While the case was still at the pleading stage, however, in 
March 2006, the US administration (then headed by President 
                                                 
67 Cfr. US Const., V Am (due process clause). On the due process clause cfr. also 
John Orth, Due Process of Law (2003). Cfr. also Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents of 
the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 US 388 (1971) (recognizing an implied cause 
of action for an individual whose constitutional rights have been violated by 
federal agents). 
68 1 Stat. 73-93: now codified as 28 USC § 1350: “The district courts shall have 
original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in 
violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.” 
69 Cfr. Louis Henkin, International Law as Law in the US, 82 Mich. L. Rev. 1560 
(1984) and Harold H. Koh, Filártiga v. Peña-Irala: Judicial Internalization of the 
Customary International Law Norm Against Torture, in International Law Stories 
(John Noyes et al. eds., 2007). As it is well know, however, this interpretation of 
the ATS is criticized by the revisionist school of foreign relations law: cfr. Curtis 
Bradley & Jack Goldsmith, Foreign Relations Law (2006), ch. 7.   
70 Filartiga v. Peña-Irala 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980). 
71 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain 542 US 692 (2004). 
72 For a more general reflection on the role that international human rights law 
can play in domestic adjudication cfr., in a comparative perspective, also 
Theodor Orlin & Martin Scheinin, Introduction, in The Jurisprudence of Human 
Rights: A Comparative Interpretive Approach (Martin Scheinin et al. eds., 
2000), 3 and Henry Steiner, Philip Alston & Ryan Goodman, International 
Human Rights in Context: Law Politics Morals (2007, 3rd ed.) 1177. 
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Bush) filed a statement of interest in the case and moved to 
intervene in the suit, requesting that the District Court dismiss the 
case on claim of the existence of a State secret privilege.73 In the 
US, the State secret privilege is not based on a Congressional act 
but rather derives from the common law jurisprudence of US 
federal courts.74 Since the 1953 decision of the US Supreme Court 
(USSCt) in US v. Reynolds,75 the government has been granted the 
privilege to resist court-ordered disclosure of information during 
litigation if “there is a reasonable danger that compulsion of the 
evidence will expose military matters which, in the interest of 
national security, should not be divulged.”76 According to the 
USSCt, to be valid, the assertion of the privilege has to be formally 
claimed by the executive branch. The court must, on a case by case 
basis, “satisfy[] itself that the occasion for invoking the privilege is 
appropriate.”77 As essentially an evidentiary privilege, the State 
secret forecloses the disclosure in court of the information it 
protects, but does not automatically compel the dismissal of an 
entire case.78 
On 12 May 2006, the judge of the District Court heard 
arguments by the parties and ordered that the government’s claim 
of the State secret privilege was valid. As a consequence, it 
granted motion to dismiss the case, bringing Mr. El-Masri’s action 
to an abrupt end before the case could even move to discovery.79 
In the opinion of the District Court, “a two step analysis”80 was 
necessary in order to decide on the question at stake. First, the 
                                                 
73 Cfr. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 24(a) (right of intervention in a 
pending procedure). 
74 Cfr. Edward Liu, The State Secret Privilege and Other Limits on Litigation 
Involving Classified Information, Congressional Research Service, R40603, May 28, 
2009. Cfr. also Louis Fisher, In the Name of National Security: Unchecked 
Presidential Power and the Reynolds Case (2006) and Robert Pallito & William 
Weaver, Presidential Secrecy and the Law (2007). 
75 US v. Reynolds, 345 US 1 (1953).  
76 Id., at 10. 
77 Id., at 11. 
78 From this point of view the State secret privilege as framed in Reynolds differs 
from the absolute bar to judicial inquiry established by the USSCt in Totten v. 
US 92 US 105 (1876) (declaring tout court nonjusticiable a case brought against 
the federal government to enforce a contract of espionage). Cfr. Liu (supra note 
74), 5. 
79 Fisher (supra note 3), 1444; Setty (supra note 59), 215. 
80 El-Masri v. Tenet (El-Masri I), 437 F. Supp. 2d 530 (E.D. Va. 2006), at 10. 
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court had to determine as a threshold matter whether the assertion 
of the State secret privilege by the government was valid in the 
case at hand. Second, if the assertion of the privilege was valid, the 
court had to consider whether dismissal of the suit was required 
or whether the case could nonetheless proceed in some fashion 
that would adequately safeguard the State secrets. 
On the first issue, the court began by stating that in its view 
“the privilege derived from the President’s constitutional 
authority over the conduct of [the US] diplomatic and military 
affairs.”81 Following the litmus test established by the US Supreme 
Court in Reynolds, then, the District Court affirmed that the 
executive had the duty to formally invoke the privilege and that 
the judiciary ought to “carefully scrutinize”82 its assertion. 
However, deferring to the greater expertise in national security 
matters of the government, the court declared itself to be satisfied 
in the case at hand that the executive had demonstrated “a 
reasonable danger that compulsion of the evidence will expose 
military matters which, in the interest of national security, should 
not be divulged.”83 On the basis of these governing principles, the 
court held that the executive’s claim was valid. In the court’s view, 
Mr. El-Masri’s complaint alleged “a clandestine intelligence 
program, and the means and method the foreign intelligence 
services of this and other countries used to carry [it] out [...]. And 
[…] any admission or denial of this allegations by the defendant in 
this case would […] present a grave risk of injury to national 
security.”84 
Having acknowledged that the executive’s assertion of the 
State secret privilege was valid, the District Court moved to the 
second issue, considering whether the case could nonetheless be 
tried without compromising sensitive information. According to 
the court, “in the instant case, this question [could be] easily 
answered in the negative. To succeed on his claim, Mr. El Masri 
would have to prove that he was abducted, detained and 
subjected to cruel and degrading treatment, all as part of the US’ 
extraordinary rendition program [and…] any answer to the 
complaint by the defendants risks the disclosure of specific details 
                                                 
81 Id., at 11. 
82 Id., at 14. 
83 Id., at 14 quoting Reynolds, at 10. 
84 El-Masri I, at 17-18. 
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about the rendition argument.”85 In the end, despite regretting 
that “the dismissal of the complaint [would] deprive[] Mr. El-
Masri of an American judicial forum for vindicating his claim,”86 
the District Court concluded that “controlling legal principles 
require[d] that in the present circumstances, Mr. El-Masri’s private 
interest must give way to the national interest in preserving State 
secrets.”87 
The decision of the District Court was appealed by Mr. El-
Masri to the US Court of Appeal for the Fourth Circuit, which on 
November 2006 reviewed the case de novo. On 2 March 2007, 
however, an unanimous three-judge panel of the Circuit Court 
affirmed the decision of the lower court. Just like the District 
Court, the judges began their opinion holding that the State secret, 
despite being an evidentiary common law privilege, “performs a 
function of constitutional significance, because it allows the 
executive branch to protect information whose secrecy is 
necessary to its military and foreign affairs responsibility.”88 The 
court also reasserted the Reynolds test – stating that the balanced 
decision of the USSCt required the judiciary to remain “firmly in 
control of deciding whether an executive assertion of the State 
secret privilege is valid, but subject to a standard mandating 
restraint in the exercise of its authority.”89 It finally confirmed that 
dismissal of a case was appropriate when “the circumstances 
make clear that sensitive military information will be so central to 
the subject matter of the litigation.”90 
Testing the case of Mr. El-Masri on these controlling 
principles, the Circuit Court argued that the litigation at hand 
could not but threaten the disclosure of relevant State secrets. 
Although Mr. El-Masri had contended that most of the evidence 
sealed by the government as State secrets had already been made 
public, the court held that “advancing a case in the court of public 
opinion, against the US at large, is an undertaking quite different 
from prevailing against specific defendants in a court of law.”91 In 
                                                 
85 Id., at 22. 
86 Id., at 24. 
87 Id., at 24. 
88 El-Masri v. US (El-Masri II), 479 F.3d 296 (4th Cir. 2007), at 14. 
89 Id., at 18. 
90 Id., at 22 quoting Sterling v. Tenet, 416 F.3d 338 (4th Cir. 2005), at 348. 
91 El-Masri II, at 31. 
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the judges’ view, “to establish a prima facie case, [Mr. El-Masri] 
would be obliged to produce admissible evidence not only that he 
was detained and interrogated, but that the defendants were 
involved in his detention and interrogation in a manner that 
renders them personally liable to him. Such a showing could be 
made only with evidence that exposes how the CIA organizes, 
staffs and supervises its most sensitive intelligence operations.”92 
In addition, the court emphasized that, because of the State secret 
privilege, the defendants could not properly defend themselves. In 
light of all this, thus, the lower court had not erred in dismissing 
the claim.93 
In the final section of its opinion, the Circuit Court dwelled 
on what role the judiciary should have when reviewing the 
assertion of the State secret privilege by the executive branch. 
Despite remarking that “the State secret doctrine does not 
represent a surrender of judicial control over access to the 
courts,”94 the judges openly admitted that their function had to be 
“modest”95 and that they would exceed their power if they could 
“disregard settled legal principles in order to reach the merit of an 
executive action […] on the ground that the President’s foreign 
policy has gotten out of line.”96 Echoing the District Court, finally, 
the judges of the Fourth Circuit “recognize[d] the gravity of [the] 
conclusion that Mr. El-Masri must be denied a judicial forum for 
his complaint”97 but pleaded that in the present circumstances the 
fundamental principle of access to court had to bow to reasons of 
national security.98 Mr. El-Masri appealed the decision of the 
Circuit Court to the USSCt. As is well known, however, review of 
a case by the highest US federal court is not automatic. On 9 
                                                 
92 Id., at 31. 
93 As the critics of the decision have noticed, de facto the Fourth Circuit in its 
decision conflates the Reyonlds and the Totten doctrines ensuring that whenever 
the government asserts a State secret privilege, the suit will be unable to move 
forward. Cfr. Huyck (supra note 64), 456. 
94 El-Masri II, at 41. 
95 Id., at 43. 
96 Id., at 43. 
97 Id., at 45. 
98 Cfr. Fisher (supra note 3), 1447; Huyck (supra note 64), 454. 
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October 2007, the USSCt denied the writ of certiorari, effectively 
terminating Mr. El-Masri’s suit.99  
Meanwhile, the ratio decidendi of the Fourth Circuit in the 
matter of State secret privilege is setting a standard toward which 
other federal courts in the US are converging. Hence, on 8 
September 2010, the US Court of Appeal for the Ninth Circuit, 
reviewing en banc a previous decision in the Mohamed case – 
another civil suit brought by an individual allegedly subjected to 
extraordinary rendition against an airline corporation, Jeppesen 
Dataplan, accused of arranging secret flights for the CIA – granted 
motion to dismiss the case at the pre-trial phase, as requested by 
the new Obama administration for reasons of State secrecy.100 
Despite a forceful dissent by five judges, and notwithstanding the 
majority’s awareness that the case presented “a painful conflict 
between human rights and national security,”101 the Circuit Court 
– drawing largely on the El-Masri decision of the Fourth Circuit102 
                                                 
99 El-Masri v. US, 552 US 947 (2007). Cfr. Aziz Huq, Supreme Court El-Masri 
Rejection Undermines Accountability for Renditions, Jurist, Oct. 12, 2007. 
100 See the critical Editorial, Torture is a Crime, Not a Secret, The New York Times, 
Sept. 9, 2010, A30, NY ed. The new Administration has established a new policy 
and procedures for the assertion of the State secret privilege in court in order to 
ensure greater accountability. In particular, the Dept. of Justice has committed 
itself to heightened the standard under which it will recur to the privilege, 
affirming that it will recur to it only to the extent necessary to protect national 
security against the risk of significant harm. Moreover, it has tailored the effects 
of its invocation, affirming that whenever possible it will allow cases to move 
forward in the event that the sensitive information at issue is not critical to the 
case - hence facilitating court review. The final decision on the assertion of the 
State secret privilege, then, is centralized in the Attorney General (Dept. of Just., 
Press release 09-1013, Sept. 23, 2009 available at 
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2009/September/09-ag-1013.html (last 
accessed June 10, 2011)). These new policies however have been criticize for 
being insufficient: cfr. e.g. Fisher (supra note 59), 254. See also Editorial, Shady 
Secrets, The International Herlad Tribune, Oct. 1, 2010, at 6. 
101 Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan Inc., 2010 US App. LEXIS 18746 (9th Cir. 2010), 
at 65. 
102 The Ninth Circuit rejected the conflation between the Reynolds and the Totten 
test that the Fourth Circuit had reached in El-Masri II. This difference, however, 
did not affect the conclusion of the case which was identical in both suits. 
Moreover, the dissenters contested that the majority had really avoided the 
conflation between the two tests made also by the Fourth Circuit, arguing 
(contrary to the opinion of the majority) that in no way could the Totten bar be 
relevant in the present case. Cfr. Mohamed (Hawkins J. dissenting), at 86. 
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– in the end “reluctantly”103 concluded that the State secret 
privilege was asserted validly and barred the suit from 
continuing.104 On 16 May 2011, then, the USSCt again denied 
certiorari to review the Ninth Circuit decision, bringing to a close 
also the Mohamed litigation.105 
In conclusion, as the previous analysis highlights, a 
consistent feature characterizes the case law of the US federal 
courts in litigation involving cases of extraordinary rendition: 
whenever the government asserts the existence of a State secret 
privilege, courts step back and, by granting motion to dismiss the 
actions for civil liability, ensure de facto immunity from judicial 
scrutiny to the executive branch and its intelligence agencies.106 
From this point of view, the jurisprudence of the US federal courts 
– as developed in particular in El-Masri (and recently confirmed in 
Mohamed) – shows striking similarities with the position of the 
Italian CCost in Abu Omar. As seen in the previous Section, 
indeed, the highest Italian court ensured a wide discretion to the 
Chief executive in invoking the State secret privilege and 
renounced any meaningful role for either the ordinary judges or 
for itself in scrutinizing whether the assertion of the privilege by 
the Prime Minister was warranted or not.107 A common pattern of 
judicial deference therefore emerges from the comparative 
assessment of courts’ decisions concerning extraordinary 
renditions and the State secret privilege both in Italy and the 
US.108 
                                                 
103 Mohamed, at 4. 
104 Id., at 47 quoting El-Masri II, at 312. 
105 Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan Inc., 2011 U.S. LEXIS 3575. See also Editorial, 
Malign Neglect, The International Herald Tribune, May 24, 2011, at 8. 
106 Cfr. Fisher (supra note 3), 1447-1448; Huyck (supra note 64), 437. Cfr. also 
Mohamed (Hawkins J. dissenting), at 83 criticizing that the majority of the Court 
for “transform[ing] an evidentiary privilege into an immunity doctrine.” 
107 Cfr. Giupponi (supra note 46), 46; Messineo (supra note 5), 1040. 
108 As well demonstrated by Laura Donohue, The Shadow of the State Secret, 159 
U. Pa. L. Rev. (2010), 77 with regard to the US, because of the deference 
demonstrated by the judiciary, the use of the State secret privilege is increasing 
also in litigation which is not related to national security. A spill-over effects, in 
other words, is taking place and transforming the privilege from an evidentiary 
rule to a powerful litigation tools in the hands of the government and of private 
actors. Similar concerns have also been voiced in Italy by Giupponi (supra note 
46). 
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Of course, any such interim conclusion shall be qualified by 
a number of caveats. Several differences between the Italian and 
US cases have already been highlighted. To begin with, US courts 
were facing actions for damages, whereas the Abu Omar case was 
a decision of a Constitutional Court umpiring conflicts between 
branches of government. The diversities of these proceedings as 
well as the specificities of the cases considered may have had 
some bearing on the decisions. In addition, while the outcome of 
El-Masri (and Mohamed) was the absolute impossibility for the 
plaintiffs to continue their claims, in Italy – notwithstanding the 
decision of the CConst in Abu Omar – the trial before the Tribunal 
of Milan was able to continue and a first judgment (now appealed) 
was delivered in November 2009. I have already underlined, 
however, how this ruling was largely shaped by the application of 
the State secret privilege:109 none of the Italian intelligence agents 
who were indicted for the crime of abduction could be tried, given 
the impossibility of using evidence which the government had 
sealed as secret against them, and only CIA officers of US 
nationality (for whom the State secret privilege was not asserted) 
were eventually condemned. In any case, they will not be subject 
to punishment, since the US refuses extradition. 
More generally, then, differences in constitutional structure 
between a parliamentary system with a centralized Constitutional 
Court, like Italy, and a system of separated institutions sharing 
power as in the US, should not be ignored. However – to follow 
the methodological insights of Ran Hirshl – analyzing “cases that 
are different on all variables that are not central to the study but 
match in terms that are, thereby emphasizing the significance of 
consistency on the key independent variable in explaining the 
similar readings on the dependent variable”110 is a sound exercise 
of comparison. The purpose of this work is to demonstrate that the 
State secret privilege trumps domestic litigation concerning cases 
of extraordinary renditions. The Abu Omar case in Italy was taken 
as a starting point and compared with case law from the US 
federal courts. Despite the differences in constitutional structure, 
mechanisms of litigation and technical outcomes in the specific 
                                                 
109 See supra text accompanying nt. 52. 
110 Ran Hirshl, The Question of Case Selection in Comparative Constitutional Law, 53 
Am J. Comp. L. (2005), 125, 139 who defines this kind of comparative exercise as 
“the most different cases logic” of comparison. 
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cases, a consistent pattern of judicial retreat before the assertion of 
the State secret privilege has emerged in both countries. Since this 
state of affairs is troubling from the perspective of the protection 
of fundamental rights, possible avenues for redress need to be 
investigated. 
 
 
4. The role of legislatures: constitutional checks and 
balances. 
Whereas both in Italy and the US courts at the domestic 
level have surrendered judicial control over the executive’s 
assertion of the State secret privilege to trump litigation 
concerning cases of extraordinary rendition,111 both the Italian 
CCost and the US federal courts have invoked in a remarkably 
converging mode the intervention of the legislative branch as a 
check against possible abuses of the State secret privilege by the 
government and as a preferential source of redress for the 
individuals allegedly subjected to extraordinary renditions. I have 
already remarked112 how in the Abu Omar case the CCost refused 
to exercise any review on the merits of the executive’s claim, 
arguing instead that “it belongs to Parliament to scrutinize the 
way in which the Prime Minister exercises his power of asserting 
the State secret privilege, since it is Parliament, as the locus of 
popular sovereignty […], which represents the institutions which 
can better oversee the highest and more pressing decisions of the 
executive.”113 Equally, in El-Masri, the District Court, while 
acknowledging that if Mr. El-Masri had suffered a wrong he 
“deserves a remedy,” 114 clarified “that the only source of that 
remedy must be the Executive Branch or the Legislative Branch, 
not the Judicial Branch.”115 The same reasoning was echoed by the 
Circuit Court in Mohamed.116 
It has already been contested whether the judiciary can 
abdicate its role while calling for greater legislative oversight and 
                                                 
111 Fisher (supra note 3), 1447. 
112 Cfr. supra text accompanying nt. 47. 
113 C.Cost. sent. 106/2009, cons. dir., §12.4. 
114 El-Masri I, at 29. 
115 Id., at 29. 
116 Mohamed, at 59. 
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remedial action.117 As Amanda Frost has argued with regard to 
the US, for example, the jurisdiction of federal courts has been 
assigned in wide terms by Congress itself,118 which may have 
deliberately used the judicial branch as a check on the abuse of the 
executive power.119 “By declining to hear cases [because of the 
executive’s assertion of the State secret privilege], courts are not 
just diminishing their own role in the constitutional structure, they 
are eliminating a constitutionally prescribed method through 
which Congress can curb the executive.”120 In similar terms, 
Tommaso Giupponi has criticized the decision of the Italian CCost 
to reject a review on the merits of the existence of the reasons that, 
in the Abu Omar case, justified the invocation of the State secret 
privilege by the Prime Minister:121 as he highlighted, Law 
124/2007 – the statute enacted by Parliament to regulate the State 
secret privilege – provides that no “State secret privilege can be 
invoked [by the government] before the Constitutional Court.”122 
It is hence reasonable to think that this provision proved the intent 
of Parliament to have the CCost oversee the action  of the 
executive branch in State secrecy matters.123 
Beyond the question of whether the judicial abdication of a 
supervisory role once the executive asserts a the State secret 
                                                 
117 For a general discussion whether political mechanisms or judicial ones 
should be preferred in the oversight of the executive branch in times of 
emergency cfr. Fiona de Londras & Fergal Davis, Controlling the Executive in 
Times of Terrorism: Competing Perspectives on Effective Oversight Mechanisms, 30 
Oxford J.L.S (2010), 19. For an overview of political oversight mechanisms in 
parliamentary and separation of powers systems cfr. also Mark Tushnet, The 
Political Constitution of Emergency Powers: Parliamentary and Separation of Powers 
Regulation, Int’l J. L. in Context (2008), 275. 
118 Cfr. US Const, Art. III, sec. 2, cl. 2 (jurisdiction of federal courts as Congress 
shall make). 
119 Amanda Frost, The State Secret Privilege and Separation of Powers, 75 Fordham 
L. Rev. (2007), 1931. 
120 Id., 1957. Cfr. also Victor Hansen, Extraordinary Renditions and the State Secret 
Privilege: Keeping Focus on the Task at Hand, 33 N.C.J. Int’l L. & Com. Reg. (2008), 
629, 652 who argues that “there is a role for both Congress and the courts in 
th[e] process” of executive oversight. 
121 Giupponi (supra note 46), 47. 
122 Law 124/2007, Art. 41(8). 
123 On the basis of this provision, in other words, the CCost should be entitled to 
access all information which the government has sealed as secrets. Cfr. also 
Giovanni Salvi, Alla Consulta il ruolo di ultimo garante, 40 Guida al diritto (2007), 
85. 
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privilege is consistent with the function that the Constitution, or 
the legislature itself, has entrusted to courts, in this Section I 
examine two other interrelated issues arising from the judicial call 
for greater involvement of the legislature. First, I assess whether – 
in constitutional terms – legislatures may meaningfully contribute 
to overseeing the action of the executive branch in matters of State 
secrecy. To this end, I highlight the differences that exist between 
parliamentary systems and separation of powers systems. Second, 
I evaluate whether – in factual terms – Parliament and Congress 
have played any role in the cases at stake, by considering whether 
the Abu Omar and the El-Masri sagas have prompted significant 
domestic reactions from the Italian and US legislative branches. As 
I will try to demonstrate, the answer to the first question (can the 
legislatures do something?) already highlights several fallacies in 
the judicial call for greater legislative involvement. It is, however, 
the answer to the second question (did the legislatures do 
something?) that proves how constitutional checks and balances 
can sometimes be insufficient to curb the executive branch and 
provide redress to individuals who have suffered human rights 
violations. 
The capacity of the legislature to check and balance the 
executive branch depends, among others, on the constitutional 
structure of the government and the political and electoral 
system.124 Historically, in a parliamentary democracy, the 
executive derives its authority from Parliament – which is the only 
branch of government directly elected by the people. As such, any 
misguided decision by the Prime Minister and his government 
could be, in the abstract, rectified by the intervention of 
Parliament, through a vote of no-confidence or other measures 
                                                 
124 A vast literature on comparative government is available both in political 
science and constitutional law scholarship. Cfr. in general Giovanni Sartori, 
Comparative Constitutional Engineering (1997); Mark Tushnet & Vicki Jackson, 
Comparative Constitutional Law (2003, 2nd ed.), ch. VII(A) but see also 
Leopoldo Elia, Governo (Forme di), in Enciclopedia del diritto, XIX (1970), ad 
vocem 634; Maurice Duverger, Institutions politiques et droit constitutionnel. 
Vol 1. Les Grands Systèmes Politiques (1970); Juan Linz, Presidential or 
Parliamentary Democracy: Does it Make a Difference?, in The Failure of Presidential 
Democracy. Vol. 1. Comparative Perspectives (Juan Linz & Arturo Valenzuela 
eds., 1994), 3.  
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provided by parliamentary procedures.125 This scheme, however, 
largely fails to account for the contemporary reality of 
parliamentary systems. In a centuries-long development, the 
balance of powers between the executives and the legislatures has 
shifted, substantially increasing the power of the former over the 
latter.126 A number of political and constitutional developments 
have favoured this transformation, including the rise of political 
parties, the personalization of electoral politics as well as the 
codification in a number of basic laws – in the attempt to 
rationalize the ‘virtues and vices’ of a parliamentary regime – of 
special powers for the executive government.127 
                                                 
125 This traditional understanding of a parliamentary system was famously 
codified in the 1789 French Declaration of the Rights of Men and Citizens, Art. 
6, which famously proclaimed that “la loi est l’expression de la volonté 
générale.” On this understanding, not only the executive was simply requested 
to execute the will of Parliament but also courts, were prevented from 
interpreting the law and, of course, from reviewing its compatibility with the 
Constitution. Cfr. Michel Troper, Justice constitutionnelle et démocratie, Revue 
française de droit constitutionnel (1990), 31. 
126 For an historical account of the transformations of parliamentary regimes in 
Europe cfr. Augusto Barbera, I parlamenti. Un’Analisi comparativa (1999) and 
Giuliano Amato, Forme di Stato e forme di governo (2006). An impressive 
reconstruction of the developments of government in human history is 
provided by the three volumes of Samuel Finer, The History of Government 
from the Earliest Time (1997). 
127 Cfr. Stefano Ceccanti, La forma di governo parlamentare in trasformazione 
(1997). The attempt to ‘rationalize’ the parliamentary regime has been more 
remarkable in France with the enactment of the 1958 Constitution. Cfr. e.g. 
Const. Fr. Art. 44(3) (power of government to ask Parliament to express a single 
vote on bill proposed by the Prime Minister), Art. 48(2) (power of government 
to decide the agenda of the bills on which Parliament shall vote for two weeks a 
month), Art. 49(3) (power of government to enact a bill as if it was approved by 
Parliament by engaging its political responsibility). Since the 1962 constitutional 
amendment and the introduction of a direct election of the President of the 
Republic, however, the French parliamentary regime is generally described as a 
semi-presidential system. Cfr. Maurice Duverger, A New Political System Model: 
Semi-Presidential Government, 8 European J. Pol. R. (1980), 165. On the 
rationalization of parliamentary regimes in other European countries cfr. also 
Arnaud Martin, Stabilité gouvernementale et rationalisation du régime parlementaire 
espagnol, Revue française de droit constitutionnel (2000), 27 (on Spain); Eugeni 
Tanchev, Parlamentarianism Rationalized, 2 E. Eu. Const. Rev. (1993), 33 (on 
Central and Eastern European countries) and the literature quote infra in nt. 
133. 
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In Europe, England pioneered these transformations 
through its conventions on the law of the Constitution, largely 
because of its simple-plurality electoral system.128 Despite some 
delays, however, also in continental Europe – at least since the 
post-war period – the executives have ceased to be the mere 
administrative agents of Parliament and have become the real 
masters of the political process.129 Leaders of political parties now 
compete in popular elections and in the case of victory enjoy a 
parliamentary majority through which they can pursue their 
political agenda.130 True enough, in many European countries, 
among which Italy,131 the existence of a proportional electoral 
system – as well as practices of ‘consociational democracy’ – have 
favoured the formations of coalition governments with a plurality 
of parties in which the Prime Minister has a weaker position.132 
Precisely to counter this role, however, many European 
                                                 
128 The classical account of these transformations is provided by Walter 
Bagheot, The English Constitution (1867). On the English model of ‘cabinet 
government’ the contemporary literature is infinite: cfr. inter alia, the recent 
works of Anthony King, The British Constitution (2007) and Richard Hefferman 
& Paul Webb, The British Prime Minister: Much More Than “First Among Equals”, 
in The Presidentialization of Politics. A Comparative Study of Modern 
Democracies (Thomas Poguntke & Paul Webb eds., 2007), 26.  
129 Cfr. in a comparative perspective Anthony King, Modes of Executive-
Legislative Relations: Great Britain, France and West Germany, 1 Legislative Studies 
Quartlerly 1 (1976), 11; Sabino Cassese, Il potere esecutivo nei sistemi parlamentari 
di governo, Quaderni Costituzionali (1993), 141; Augusto Barbera & Carlo 
Fusaro, Il governo delle democrazie (2001). 
130 Cfr. in a comparative constitutional law perspective Giuseppe Morbidelli, 
Lucio Pegoraro, Antonio Reposo & Mauro Volpi, Diritto pubblico comparato 
(2005), ch. V and, from a political science perspective Lieven de Winter, The Role 
of Parliament in Government Formation and Resignation, in Parliaments and 
Majority Rule in Western Europe (Herbert Döring ed., 1995), 115.  
131 Italy has had a proportional electoral system from 1948 to 1993 but a mixed 
electoral system (with a prevailing majoritarian component) between 1993 and 
2005. In 2005, a bill reintroduced a proportional system: nevertheless, the 
consolidation of a bipolar political competition seems (despite several steps 
backwards and numerous uncertainties) under way. For an introduction to the 
current electoral legislation cfr. Carlo Fusaro, Party System Developments and 
Electoral Legislation in Italy (1948-2009), 1 Bulletin of Italian Politics (2009), 49. On 
the most recent developments cfr. also Andrea Morrone, Governo, opposizione, 
democrazia maggioritaria, Il Mulino 4 (2003), 637 and Vincenzo Lippolis, Riforma 
della legge elettorale e forma di governo, Quaderni Costituzionali (2007), 342.  
132 For a classical distinction between ‘majoritarian’ and ‘consociational’ 
democracy cfr. Arend Lijphart, Patters of Democracy (1999).  
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Constitutions have assigned to the executive branch a special 
status in Parliament, strengthening its capacity to set the agenda 
and making a vote of no-confidence by the legislature unlikely or 
extremely difficult.133  
In a system of separation of powers as in the US (often – 
inappropriately – called a presidential system),134 instead, the 
executive branch is endowed with an autonomous popular 
legitimacy from that of Congress.135 Hence, the latter cannot (save 
through the impeachment procedure)136 challenge the actions, no 
matter how misguided, of the former by terminating his office.137 
The reverse, however, is also true: the President cannot affect the 
operations of Congress and force it to follow his lead, e.g. by 
threatening a new anticipated election.138 In the US constitutional 
system, the political branches of government are separate and 
enjoy an independent electoral legitimacy.139 In the intent of the 
Founding fathers, this institutional arrangement was adopted to 
ensure a reciprocal balance between the legislature and the 
executive, on the assumption that mutual controls would avoid 
the establishment of an arbitrary government.140 The structure of 
                                                 
133 Cfr. e.g. Basic Law FRG, Art. 67 (constructive no-confidence vote) – on which 
see Karl-Rudolf Korte & Manuel Fröhlich, Politik und Regieren in Deutschland 
(2004); Const. Sp., Art. 113 (constructive no-confidence vote) – on which see 
Eduardo Virgala Foruria, La moción de censura en la Constitución de 1978 
(1988). 
134 For the celebrated definition of the US system of government as “separated 
institutions sharing power” cfr. Richard Neustadt, Presidential Power and the 
Modern President (1990, rev. ed.), 29. 
135 Cfr. US Const. Art. II, sec. 1, cl. 3 (election of the President). 
136 Cfr. US Const. Art. II, sec. 4 (removal from office of the President). 
137 Cfr. US Const. Art. II, sec. 1, cl. 1 juncto Am. XXII (term of President office 
four years renewable once). 
138 Cfr. US Const. Art. I, sec. 2, cl. 1 (term of Representatives two years) and Art. 
I, sec. 3, cl. 1 (term of Senators six years). 
139 Theodor Lowi & Benjamin Ginsberg, American Government: Freedom and 
Power (1990); Louis Fisher, American Constitutional Law. Vol 1. Constitutional 
Structures: Separated Powers and Federalism (1995, 2nd ed.); Laurence Tribe, 
American Constitutional Law, Vol. 1 (2000, 3rd ed.), ch. 2.  
140 Cfr. Federalist Papers, LI (Madison) stating that the US Constitution is crafted 
to ensure that “ambition must be made to counteract ambition”. As it is well 
known a lively debate is taking place in the US about the virtues and vices of 
the US separation of powers system. Compare Bruce Ackerman, The New 
Separation of Powers, 113 Harv. L. Rev. (2000), 633 and Steven Calabresi, The 
Virtues of Presidential Government, 18 Const. Comm. (2001), 51. 
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the US constitutional system, otherwise, requires the branches to 
share power:141 and since the President must obtain the consent of 
Congress to implement his agenda, the legislature plays a role in 
shaping the policies of the executive and in controlling its 
implementation.  
Also in the US, however, the “constitutional dialogues”142 
between the political branches of government have largely 
evolved over time, significantly departing from what the framers 
had in mind when the US Constitution was enacted in 1787.143 In 
particular, two developments have affected the US institutional 
arrangement: i.e. the consolidation of a two-party system and the 
transition from a Congressional to a Presidential government. 
Party politics and interests representation have made the activity 
of both branches subject to electoral competition based on 
alternative political agendas144 and have increased the possibility 
of a ‘divided government’ – the Presidency and Congress being 
controlled by different political parties.145 The rise of the modern 
Presidency,146 in the New Deal era and especially during the Cold 
War, has produced an extraordinary expansion of the 
administrative apparatus147 and, in reaction to this, the 
establishment of new Congressional mechanisms of review, e.g. 
                                                 
141 Cfr. Neustadt (supra note 134), 29. 
142 I draw the expression from Louis Fisher, Constitutional Dialogues: 
Interpretation as Political Process (1988). 
143 Cfr. e.g. Lowi – Ginsberg (supra note 139); Fisher (supra note 139) and 
especially the paramount work of Bruce Ackerman, We the People: Vol. 2. 
Transformations (1998). For an historical account of the ‘constitutional vision’ of 
the founding period cfr. also Gordon Wood, The Creation of the American 
Republic 1776-1787 (1998, 2nd ed ); Akhil Reed Amar, America’s Constitution. A 
Biography (2006). 
144 On the rise of party politics in the US cfr. the classic works of Walter 
Burnham, Party System and the Political Process, in The American Party Systems 
(William Chambers & Walter Burnham eds., 1967), 292 and Leon Epstein, 
Political Parties in the American Mold (1986). 
145 On ‘divided government’ cfr. David Mayhew, Divided We Govern: Party 
Control, Lawmaking and Investigations 1946-2002 (2005, 2nd ed.) and Morris 
Fiorina, Divided Government (1996). 
146 Cfr. the classical Arthur Schlessinger Jr., The Imperial Presidency (1973) but see 
also Thomas Cronin, The Invention of the American Presidency (1989). 
147 Cfr. Cass Sunstein, Constitutionalism After the New Deal, 101 Harv. L. Rev. 
(1987), 415 and Peter Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of 
Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84 Columbia L. Rev. (1984) 574. 
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through oversight committees and the practice of holding public 
hearings.148  
These phenomena have affected the capacity of the 
legislatures, both in Europe and the US, to oversee the executive’s 
action. In parliamentary systems, because of the continuum 
between parliamentary majorities and executive governments, the 
role of Parliament in the oversight of the executive branch has 
sharply diminished. Nowadays, rather, the ‘opposition in 
Parliament’ – i.e. the political parties which do not share the 
platform on which the government was elected – has the role to 
check the actions of the Prime Minister and to bring to the 
attention of the public at large the inadequacies of the executive.149 
Following the British practice of the ‘shadow cabinet’, a number of 
Continental European countries have found it convenient to 
formalize this model, but not always successfully.150 In the US 
system of separation of powers, the ability of the political branches 
to check each other has, for structural reasons, traditionally been 
greater: nevertheless, Congress’s role in controlling the action of 
the executive increasingly depends on political contingency – with 
greater scrutiny in times of ‘divided government’ and a more 
constrained stand in the periods in which both Congress and the 
Presidency are dominated by the same political majority.151 
The difficulties faced by legislatures in overseeing 
executive action seem even greater in the field of counter-
                                                 
148 On the role of Congress vis-à-vis the Presidency cfr. Nelson Polsby, Congress 
and the Presidency (1986) and more recently Nelson Polsby, How Congress 
Evolves (2004). 
149 Cfr. Robert Dahl, Patterns of Opposition, in Political Opposition in Western 
Democracies (Robert Dahl ed., 1966), 332. 
150 On the shadow cabinet in Britain cfr. David R. Turner, The Shadow Cabinet in 
British Politics (1969) and Giuseppe de Vergottini, Lo Shadow Cabinet. Saggio sul 
rilevo costituzionale dell’opposizione nel regime parlamentare britannico (1973). For 
the institutionalization of a ‘statute of the opposition’ in other European 
countries cfr. Ignacio Fernandez Sarasola, El control parlamentario y su regulación 
en el Ordenamiento español, Revista Española de Derecho Constitucional (2000) 
(on Spain); Giovanni Guzzetta, La fine della centralità parlamentare e lo statuto 
dell’opposizione, in Come chiudere la transizione? (Stefano Ceccanti & Salvatore 
Vassallo eds., 2004), 301 (on Italy); Pierre Avril, Le statut de l’opposition : un 
feuilleton inachevé (Les articles 4 et 51-1 de la Constitution), Les Petits Affiches, Dec. 
19, 2008, at 9 (on France). 
151 Cfr. Daryl Levinson & Richard Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not Powers, 119 
Harv. L. Rev. (2006), 2311. 
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terrorism, where the executive can either claim a constitutional 
role in ensuring national security or greater expertise and ability 
to act swiftly.152 A burgeoning literature has accounted for the 
tremendous, and largely unchecked, expansion of Presidential 
powers in the US after 9/11.153 It should be emphasized, however, 
that the strengthening of the executive branch has also been 
remarkable in parliamentary systems “which are formally 
adhering to the legislative model”154 – that is, those systems which 
require anti-terrorism initiatives, with an impact on human rights, 
to be based on special legislation establishing concrete rules and 
specific powers for the executive government.155 These general 
considerations on the role of legislatures are well reflected in the 
institutional mechanisms and political practices existing both in 
Italy and the US with regard to parliamentary or congressional 
oversight of the actions of the executive branch in matters of State 
secrecy. 
In Italy, Law 124/2007 established a Parliamentary 
Committee on the Security of the Republic (COPASIR) to ensure a 
legislative oversight of executive action in matters of intelligence 
                                                 
152 Cfr. inter alia Mark Tushnet, Controlling Executive Power in the War on 
Terrorism, 118 Harv. L. Rev. (2005), 2637; Bruce Ackerman, Before the Next Attack. 
Preserving Civil Liberties in an Age of Terrorism (2006); Paolo Bonetti, Terrorismo, 
emergenza e costituzioni democratiche (2006); Andreas Paulus & Mindia 
Vashakmadze, Parliamentary Control Over the Use of Armed Forces Against 
Terrorism: in Defence of the Separation of Powers, 38 Netherland Yearbook Eur. L. 
(2007), 113. 
153 Cfr. e.g. Fisher (supra note 3); Frederick Schwarz & Aziz Huq, Unchecked and 
Unbalanced: Presidential Power in a Time of Terror (2007); Scott Matheson Jr., 
Presidential Constitutionalism in Perilous Times (2009). 
154 Daphne Barak-Erez, Terrorism Law Between the Executive and Legislative 
Models, 57 Am. J. Comp. L. (2009), 877, 891. 
155 On the difficulties of Parliaments (and the opposition in it) to check the 
executive branch in times of national crises cfr. Yigal Mersel, How Patriotic Can 
the Opposition Be? The Constitutional Role of the Minority Party in Times of Peace 
and During National Crises, NYU Global Law Working Paper 2 (2004); Dirk 
Haubrich, September 11, Anti-Terrorism Laws and Civil Liberties: Britain, France and 
Germany Compared, in Government and Opposition (2003), 3. For a more general 
discussion about the presidentialization of constitutional systems in the post-
9/11 era cfr. also Kim Lane Scheppele, The Migration of Anti-Constitutional Ideas: 
the Post-9/11 Globalization of Public Law and the International State of Emergency, in 
The Migration of Constitutional Ideas (Sujit Choundry ed., 2007) 347. 
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agencies and the State secret privilege.156 COPASIR is composed of 
five members of the Camera dei Deputati – i.e. the lower Chamber 
of Parliament – and five members of the Senato – i.e. the higher 
Chamber of Parliament – nominated by the Presidents of the two 
branches of the legislature, and it ensures the equal representation 
of both the members of the majority party (or coalition parties) in 
Parliament and of the opposition. To guarantee a meaningful 
involvement of the minority parties and an effective check on the 
activity of the government, the law requires that the President of 
COPASIR be chosen among the members of the opposition.157 
COPASIR has oversight, advisory and investigative functions158 
and shall be regularly informed by the executive of all his 
decisions.159 COPASIR can access, under a duty of confidentiality, 
security files160 and shall report to Parliament every year on the 
advancement of its activities.161 
Nevertheless, as a matter of fact, the powers of COPASIR to 
review the decisions of the executive branch in issues of State 
secrecy may be quite limited.162 Indeed, the Prime Minister – when 
the sharing of information with COPASIR may jeopardize “the 
security of the Republic, the relationship with foreign States, the 
course of ongoing operation or the security of sources of 
information and agents of the secret services”163 – can assert a 
State secret privilege and refuse the disclosure of documents even 
to COPASIR. Law 124/2007 requires that the executive not invoke 
a State secret privilege when COPASIR is investigating 
institutional misconducts by intelligence officers:164 however, in 
                                                 
156 The COPASIR has replaced the Parliamentary Committee established under 
Law 801/1977 named COPACO. Cfr. Paolo Bonetti, Aspetti costituzionali del 
nuovo sistema di informazione per la sicurezza della Repubblica, Diritto e società 
(2008), 251 and Francesco Sidoti, The Italian Intelligence Service, in Gehaimdienste 
in Europa (Thomas Jäger & Anna Daun eds., 2009), 78. 
157 Law 124/2007, Art. 31 (structure and composition of COPASIR). 
158 Law 124/2007, Art.s 31, 32 and 34 (functions of COPASIR). 
159 Law 124/2007, Art. 33 (duty of government to inform COPASIR). 
160 Law 124/2007, Art. 36 (duty of COPASIR not to disclose secrets). 
161 Law 124/2007, Art. 35 (duty of COPASIR to report yearly its activities to 
Parliament). 
162 Cfr. Giupponi & Fabbrini (supra note 14), 458. 
163 Law 124/2007, Art. 31(8). 
164 Law 124/2007, Art. 31(9) (prohibition for government to refuse disclosure of 
information to COPASIR when the latter is investigating misconducts by 
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fact, this would seem to be only a minor hurdle, as it is up to the 
executive itself to decide whether the COPASIR’s request can be 
rejected. Against the decision of the Prime Minister, the only 
weapon in the hands of COPASIR is to refer the matter to 
Parliament, “for consequential evaluations,”165 following the 
traditional logic of parliamentary control of executive action. For 
the reasons mentioned above, however, this hardly seems 
satisfactory. 
In the US, both houses of Congress have established 
intelligence oversight Committees.166 No legal framework, 
however, regulates the assertion of the State secret privilege by the 
executive and its control by the legislature.167 During the 111th 
Congress (in times of ‘divided government’), bills were advanced 
either in the House of Representative or in the Senate, attempting 
to impose more stringent conditions on the invocation of the 
privilege by the President and requiring the Attorney General to 
report to the Congressional intelligence Committees on cases in 
which the executive had asserted the State secret privilege in 
court.168 Nevertheless, none of the proposed measures has yet 
been enacted (and the arrival of a new administration, of the same 
political party of the congressional majority has slowed reform 
efforts during the 112th Congress). In addition, the previous US 
President strongly opposed any reform of the State secret 
privilege, claiming that any regulation of the matter by the 
                                                 
165 Law 124/2007, Art. 31(10). 
166 Cfr. 50 USC § 413 (reports to Congressional Committees of intelligence 
activities and anticipated activities). On the role of the intelligence oversight 
Committees in controlling the executive branch in counter-terrorism policies 
and its difficulties cfr. Anne O’Connell, The Architecture of Smart Intelligence: 
Structuring and Overseeing Agencies in the Post-9/11 World, 94 Cal. L. Rev. (2006), 
1655. Note that just before the electoral recess of fall 2010 Congress approved 
the Intelligence Authorization bill – H.R. 2701 – the first piece of legislation in 
the field of intelligence oversight of the last six years, to ensure greater 
disclosure to the Congressional Committee of secret CIA activity by the 
President. The bill is now waiting Presidential signature to enter into force. 
Critics, however, have voiced concern about the effectiveness of the act. Cfr. 
Greg Miller, With Bill, Congress Reasserts Oversight of Secret CIA Activities, The 
Washington Post, Oct. 1, 2010, at A22. 
167 Cfr. also Heidi Kitrosser, Congressional Oversight of National Security Activity: 
Improving Information Funnels, 29 Cardozo L. Rev. (2008), 1049. 
168 Cfr. H.R. 984 (State Secret Protection bill); S. 417 (State Secret Protection bill) 
on which see Liu (supra note 74), 12 and Setty (supra note 59), 218. 
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legislature would be inconsistent with his constitutional role of 
ensuring national security, and warning that it could “refuse to 
comply with the legislated state secrets framework based on the 
theory of constitutional avoidance.”169 
In this context, it should come as no surprise that the Italian 
Parliament and the US Congress did not take steps in reaction to 
the Abu Omar and El-Masri cases. Despite the decision of the 
Italian Prime Ministers to raise three different conflicts of 
allocation of powers before the CCost on the claim that the judicial 
investigation in the Abu Omar case had threatened the disclosure 
of allegedly secret information concerning the relationship 
between the CIA and the SISMI, the COPASIR (both at the time of 
the centre-left government of Mr. Prodi and during the 
conservative government of Mr. Berlusconi) neither requested 
explanations from the executive branch concerning the alleged 
abduction of Mr. Abu Omar nor activated autonomous 
investigations to verify whether the action of the Prime Minister in 
barring criminal prosecutions of SISMI agents was justified. By the 
same token, the US Congress failed to react to the broad assertion 
of State secret privilege in litigation concerning cases of 
extraordinary renditions.170 Even though these events were among 
the motivating factors in pushing the US legislator (but only once 
the Democratic Party gained majority in 2007) to advance reforms 
regarding the State secret privilege,171 Congress neither ordered 
any independent investigation on the alleged wrongdoing nor 
took any other effective remedial actions.172 
                                                 
169 Setty (supra note 59), 223-224. For an explanation of the theory of 
‘constitutional avoidance’ and for its criticism cfr. Trevor Morrison, 
Constitutional Avoidance in the Executive Branch, 106 Columbia L. Rev. (2006) 
1189. Departing from the stand of the previous Administration, however, the 
new policies and procedures elaborated by the Dept. of Justice on the assertion 
of the State secret privilege require the Attorney General to provide periodic 
reports on all cases in which the privilege is asserted to the appropriate 
oversight Committees in Congress (Dept. of Just., Press release 09-1013, Sept. 
23, 2009 available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2009/September/09-ag-
1013.html (last accessed June 10, 2011)). See also supra nt. 100. 
170 Cfr. Jared Perkins, The State Secrets Privilege and the Abdication of Oversight, 21 
BYU J. Pub. L. (2007), 235, 259 who highlights how “Congress is unlikely to be 
the champion of the cause of suspected terrorists (even though it is now clear 
that label is not applicable to Mr. Arar, nor, most likely, to Mr. El-Masri).” 
171 Setty (supra note 59), 213. 
172 Cfr. Cole (supra note 55), 39. 
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From this point of view, an often cited model173 is the 
independent Commission established by the Canadian 
government to investigate the involvement of the Canadian 
security forces in the extraordinary rendition of Mr. Maher Arar – 
a Canadian national born in Syria who was rendered by the US to 
Syria under suspicion of being a terrorist suspect and allegedly 
subjected to torture and other inhumane and degrading 
treatments.174 It is remarkable, however, that although the 
Canadian authorities had only the (albeit relevant) role of sharing 
inaccurate and unreliable intelligence with the CIA, while US 
authorities bore the (almost entire) responsibility for the unlawful 
decision to detain Mr. Arar and secretly remove him to Syria, it 
was Canada – and not the US – that set up a special inquiry to 
report on the case and eventually decided to award Mr. Arar a 
significant payment in compensatory damages.175 Hence, not only 
was Mr. Arar unable to obtain judicial redress in the US:176 The US 
executive and Congress consistently refused to provide an 
alternative remedy, among others by declining any invitation by 
the Arar Commission to participate in the inquiry.177 
In conclusion, as the analysis above highlights, there are 
serious concerns about the role of the legislative branch in 
ensuring a meaningful constitutional check on possible abuses by 
the executive branch in the assertion of a State secret privilege. 
                                                 
173 Cfr. Tushnet (supra note 117), 284; Cole (supra note 55), 39. 
174 For an account of the facts involving Mr. Arar and for an overview of the 
judicial proceedings that followed cfr. Fisher (supra note 3), 1436; Erin 
Craddock, Torturous Consequences and the Case of Maher Arar: Can Canadian 
Solutions “Cure” The Due Process Deficiencies in the US Removal Proceedings?, 93 
Cornell L. Rev. (2008), 621 
175 Cfr. the two reports of the ad hoc Commission of Inquiry into the Actions of 
Canadian Officials in Relation to Maher Arar: Report of the Events Relating to 
Maher Arar: Analysis and Recommendations (2006); A New Review Mechanisms for 
the RCMP’s National Security Activity (2006). Cfr. also Cornel Marian, Learning 
from Others: The Scalia-Breyer Debate and the Benefit of Foreign Sources of Law to US 
Constitutional Interpretation of Counter-Terrorism Initiatives, 4 Int’l J. Const. L. 1 
(2010), 5, 11 who contrasts the Arar case with El-Masri.  
176 Cfr. supra nt. 62. 
177 Cfr. Kent Roach, Review and Oversight of National Security Activities and Some 
Reflection on Canada’s Arar Inquiry, 29 Cardozo L. Rev. (2007), 53, 82 who 
highlights that “the Canadian inquiry might have been even more effective had 
the US and Syrian governments not declined the inquiry’s invitation to 
participate.”  
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Although both in the US and in Italy courts have stepped back 
and invoked “nonjudicial relief,”178 institutional design and 
political dynamics in both parliamentary and separation of 
powers systems make legislative oversight of executive action 
difficult. It goes without saying that any such conclusion is 
tentative and should not be over-generalized. Professor Mark 
Tushnet has rightly argued that, “even in settings quite 
unfavourable to the development of constraints on the flow of 
power to executive government during emergencies, political 
control can work, and sometimes might work in real time more 
effectively that judicial controls.”179 In the specific case under 
review here, however, both the Italian Parliament and the US 
Congress have proved too weak in counteracting the recourse by 
the executive to the State secret privilege. Additional means of 
redress need therefore to be considered. 
 
 
5. The role of supranational courts: multilevel protection 
of fundamental rights. 
The previous analysis has demonstrated that both in the US 
and in Italy, domestic courts have been unwilling or unable to 
review the assertion of the State secret privilege by the executive, 
even when the cases pending in their dockets concern allegations 
of extraordinary renditions and severe infringements of human 
rights. The capacity of domestic legislatures to oversee and curb 
the action of the executive branch, otherwise, has turned out to be 
limited both in the Italian parliamentary system and in the US 
system of separation of powers. If this is so, what can be an 
alternative venue of redress for individuals like Mr. Abu Omar 
and Mr. El-Masri, who have suffered severe infringements of their 
most basic rights – being abducted and secretly renditioned to be 
interrogated and detained in countries which are widely known to 
practice torture and other inhumane and degrading treatments? 
In this section I examine the role that could be played by 
institutions who have jurisdiction to hear individual human rights 
claim beyond the State.180 To this end, I first outline – in 
                                                 
178 Mohamed, at 58-59 (emphasis in the original). 
179 Tushnet (supra note 117), 287 (emphasis in the original). 
180 On the concept of multilevel protection of fundamental rights cfr. Ingolf 
Pernice & Ralf Kanitz, Fundamental Rights and Multilevel Constitutionalism in 
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constitutional terms – the main institutional and jurisprudential 
features of the supranational systems for the protection of 
fundamental rights which operate in the European and the 
American contexts. Secondly, I analyze – in factual terms – whether 
these human rights arrangements can provide an effective 
mechanism to relief the human rights violations here at stake. As I 
will try to demonstrate, the assessment of the first issue reveals a 
major difference between Italy and the US: contrary to the latter, 
indeed, Italy – as the other European countries – is subject to a 
stringent supervision by supranational human rights bodies which 
can hold it liable for its illicit conduct. These structural differences 
affect the second issue, concerning the practical ability of 
supranational courts to offer an additional forum in which cases of 
extraordinary renditions and State secrecy, such as the one alleged 
by Mr. Abu Omar and Mr. El-Masri, can be effectively adjudicated 
and redressed. 
The capacity of supranational institutions to ensure an 
additional forum in which human rights claim can be heard 
depends, among others, by institutional as well as jurisprudential 
factors.181  In the European context, Italy is bound by the European 
                                                                                                                       
Europe, Walter Hallstein-Institute paper 7 (2004) now reprinted in The 
Emerging Constitution of the European Union (Deidre Curtin et al. eds., 2004); 
Giovanni Guzzetta, Garanzia multilivello dei diritti e dialogo tra le Corti nella 
prospettiva di un Bill of Rights europeo, in Tutela dei diritti fondamentali e 
costituzionalismo multilivello. Tra Europa e Stati nazionali (Antonio d’Atena & 
Pierfrancesco Grossi eds., 2004), 155. On the idea of constitutionalism beyond 
the State more generally cfr. instead European Constitutionalism Beyond the 
State (Joseph H.H. Weiler & Marlene Wind eds., 2004); Matthias Kumm, The 
Cosmopolitan Turn in Constitutionalism: On the Relationship between 
Constitutionalism In and Beyond the State, in Ruling the World: Constitutionalism, 
International Law and Global Governance (Jeffrey Dunoff & Joel Trachtman 
eds., 2009), 258. 
181 The article will focus here only on the role ‘regional’ human rights 
institutions. Both the US and European countries are then parties to global 
human rights treaties, including the 1966 UN International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights (ICCPR) and are therefore subject to the universal periodic 
review of the UN Human Rights Council. Cfr. e.g. Report of the USA submitted to 
the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (2010). Equally, the US and 
European countries are parties to the UN Convention Against Torture (CAT). 
However, the oversight and adjudicatory mechanisms established by these UN 
human rights regimes are not comparable with those operating in the 
framework of regional organizations such as the ECHR. The US, in addition, is 
not a party to the Optional Protocol of the ICCPR, on the basis of which a 
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Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) – an international treaty 
adopted under the aegis of the Council of Europe in the aftermath 
of World War II (WWII) and later integrated by several additional 
protocols182 which has been now ratified by 47 European States 
(including all the 27 Member States of the European Union)183. The 
ECHR codifies a bill of basic civil and political rights that 
Contracting Parties are obliged to respect vis-à-vis all individuals 
falling under their jurisdiction. Furthermore, to ensure the 
effectiveness of these provisions, the ECHR has also established a 
powerful institutional machinery.184 The heart of this institutional 
                                                                                                                       
supervisory international body may hear petitions submitted by private 
individuals alleging violation by State Parties of the rights recognized in the 
ICCPR. Specifically on the CAT obligations binding the US and its impact in the 
field of extraordinary renditions cfr. instead Michael J. Garcia, Renditions: 
Constraints Imposed by the Laws on Torture, Congressional Research Service, 
RL32890, Sept. 8, 2009. 
182 On the historical reasons that explain the creation of a human rights 
architecture beyond the States in post-WW II Europe cfr. Andrew Moravcsik, 
The Origins of Human Rights Regimes: Democratic Delegation in Postwar Europe, 54 
Int’l Org. (2000), 217; Stephen Gardbaum, Human Rights and International 
Constitutionalism, in Ruling the World: Constitutionalism, International Law and 
Global Governance (Jeffrey Dunoff & Joel Trachtman eds., 2009), 233. 
183 The European Union (EU) is endowed of its own human rights catalogue – 
the Charter of Fundamental Rights (CFR) – and has established an extremely 
effective judicial body: the European Court of Justice. The CFR however (still) 
applies just to the EU institutions and to the EU Member States only when their 
acts fall under the scope of application of EU law. Compare Joseph H.H. Weiler, 
Fundamental Rights and Fundamental Boundaries: on the Conflict of Standard and 
Values in the Protection of Human Rights in the European Legal Space, in The 
European Union and Human Rights (Nanette Neuwahl & Allan Rosas eds., 1995) 
now reprinted in The Constitution of Europe (1999), ch. 3 and Martin Shapiro, 
Rights in the European Union: Convergent with the USA?, in The State of the EU. 
Vol. 7: With US or Against US? European Trends in American Perspective 
(Nicolas Jabko & Craig Parsons eds., 2005) 378. As such, the role of EU is still 
limited in the field under review in this paper. However on the most recent 
trends in the use of the State secret privilege at the EU level cfr.: Emilio de 
Capitani, Unione Europea e segreto di Stato: un quadro normativo ancora in piena 
evoluzione, Astrid Rassegne, Sep. 6, 2010. 
184 On the institutional machinery of the ECHR cfr. Antonio Bultrini, Il 
meccanismo di protezione dei diritti fondamentali istituito dalla Convenzione europea 
dei diritti dell’uomo. Cenni introduttivi, in La Convenzione europea dei diritti 
dell’uomo. Profili ed effetti nell’ordinamento italiano (Bruno Nascimbene ed., 
2002), 20. Cfr. also Alec Stone Sweet, Sur la constitutionnalisation de la Convention 
européenne des droits de l’homme, 80 Revue trimestrielle des droits de l’homme 
(2009), 923 who argues that the ECHR, despite its Treaty-like nature, has 
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system is represented by the ECtHR, an independent judicial body 
empowered to hear and adjudicate individual human rights 
applications against the Signatory States. The ECtHR is assisted by 
a Council of Ministers (in which the representatives of the 
governments of the Contracting Parties sit), which overviews the 
enforcement of the ECtHR’s decisions; it also used to be flanked 
by a Human Rights Commission (ECommHR) – which evaluated 
the admissibility of the individual applications and proposed a 
friendly settlement of the disputes.      
As membership of the ECHR steadily expanded to the 
countries of Central and Eastern Europe in the late 1990s, 
however, the institutional devices for the protection of 
fundamental rights have been refined and the role of the ECtHR 
has been strongly enhanced.185 In particular, since the enactment 
of the 11th additional Protocol to the ECHR in 1998, the ECtHR 
and the ECommHR have been merged and the jurisdiction of the 
former over individual petitions has been made compulsory and 
automatic for all Contracting Parties. As a consequence, “any 
person, non-governmental organisation or group of individuals 
claiming to be the victim of a violation by one of the High 
Contracting Parties of the rights set forth in the ECHR or the 
protocols thereto”186 may bring an individual action in front of the 
ECtHR.187 To be able to commence legal proceedings before the 
ECtHR, the ressortissants must have exhausted all national 
remedies unsuccessfully.188 If the ECtHR finds that there has been 
                                                                                                                       
undergone tremendous transformations in recent years and may be today 
accounted as a trans-European Constitution. Cfr. also Loizodou v. Turkey 
(Application No. 15318/89) [ECtHR] judgment on the preliminary objections 
March 23, 1995, at §75 (defining the ECHR as the constitutional instrument of 
the European public order). 
185 Robert Harmsen, The Transformation of the ECHR Legal Order and the Post-
Enlargement Challenges Facing the European Court of Human Rights, in The 
National Judicial Treatment of ECHR and EU Laws. A Comparative 
Constitutional Perspective (Giuseppe Martinico & Oreste Pollicino eds., 2010), 
27. 
186 ECHR, Art. 34 (allegation of victim status). 
187 These phenomena have de facto transformed the ECtHR in a supra-national 
Constitutional court: Compare Jean François Flauss, La Cour européenne des droit 
de l’homme est-elle une Cour constitutionnelle?, Revue Française Droit 
Constitutionnel (1998), 711 and Luzius Wildhaber, A Constitutional Future for the 
European Court of Human Rights?, 23 H.R.L.Rev. (2002), 161. 
188 ECHR, Art. 35 (exhaustion of prior domestic remedies). 
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a violation of the ECHR and its protocols it can afford just 
satisfaction to the injured party,189 essentially by compelling a 
State found guilty of breaching ECHR rights to pay pecuniary 
damages.190  
The human rights machinery constraining the US at the 
supranational level, on the contrary, is much weaker.191 Indeed, 
despite having been among the promoter of the creation, on the 
ashes of WWII, of new international institutions and of the 
adoption of a universal Bill of rights (i.e. the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights),192 for several reasons the US still systematically 
refuses to subject itself to the external scrutiny of a human rights 
institution akin to the ECtHR.193 At the regional level, the 
American Human Rights Convention (ACHR) has been signed but 
not yet ratified by the US, with the consequence that the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR) has no jurisdiction 
over individual human rights claims raised against the US.194 The 
US has only approved the 1948 American Declaration of the 
Rights and Duties of Men (ADRDM) and is a Party to the 
                                                 
189 ECHR, Art. 41 (just satisfaction). 
190 Cfr. Alec Stone Sweet & Helen Keller, The Reception of the ECHR in National 
Legal Orders, in A Europe of Rights (Helen Keller & Alec Stone Sweet eds., 
2008), 3; Giuseppe Franco Ferrari, National Judges and Supranational Laws. On the 
Effective Application of EU Law and ECHR, in The National Judicial Treatment of 
ECHR and EU Laws. A Comparative Constitutional Perspective (Giuseppe 
Martinico & Oreste Pollicino eds., 2010), 21. 
191 Note that the Inter-American human rights system is not, in itself, 
structurally weaker than the European one. Simply, the US is not subject to the 
adjudicatory and enforcement mechanisms set up under the ACHR (which are 
instead quite similar to the one of the ECHR). Cfr. text accompanying infra nt. 
194.  
192 On the leading role of the US in establishing international human rights 
institutions cfr. Mery Anne Glendon, A World Made New: Eleanor Roosevelt 
and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (2001) and Philippe Sands, 
Lawless World. America and the Making and Breaking of Global Rule (2005). 
193 On the position of the US vis-à-vis international human rights institutions 
compare Harold H. Koh, Restoring America’s Human Rights Reputation, 40 
Cornell Int’l L. J. (2007), 635 with Jed Rubenfeld, The Two World Orders, in 
European and US Constitutionalism (Georg Nolte ed., 2005), 280. 
194 On the Inter-American human rights system generally cfr. Scott Davidson, 
The Inter-American Human Rights System (1997) and on the IACtHR specificall 
cfr. Juan Antonio Trevieso, La Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos opiniones 
consultivas y fallos: la jurisprudencia de la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos 
(1996). 
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Organization of the American States (OAS), whose Charter 
institutes an Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 
(IACommHR).195 Nevertheless, the Statute of the IACommHR – 
adopted by the OAS General Assembly in 1979 – specifies that the 
powers of the IACommHR are extremely limited in relation to 
those States which have not signed the ACHR.196  
In fact, with respect to these countries, the IACommHR has 
only a general function to monitor the human rights situation, to 
promote respect for fundamental rights and to raise human rights 
awareness, but it has no power to adjudicate individual 
applications.197 Specifically, after the exhaustion of national 
remedies, private parties may file a complaint to the IACommHR 
alleging a violation of the ADRDM.198 The IACommHR, 
nevertheless, can only “examine [the] communications submitted 
to it and any other available information, […] address the 
government of any member state not a Party to the [ACHR] for 
information deemed pertinent by this Commission, and [..] make 
recommendations to it, when it finds this appropriate, in order to 
bring about more effective observance of fundamental human 
rights.”199 No judicial decision with binding effect on the 
Signatory State can therefore be adopted by the IACommHR, even 
when it finds a violation of the fundamental rights enshrined in 
the ADRDM. Rather, the role of the IACommHR is that of 
providing an international forum in which the action of the States 
can be subject to public scrutiny – with the hope that ‘naming and 
                                                 
195 On the IACommHR cfr. Robert Goldman, History and Action: The Inter-
American Human Rights System and the Role of the Inter-American Commission on 
Human Rights, 31 H.R. Quarterly (2009), 856 and Maria B. Galli & Ariel 
Dulitzky, A Comissão Interamericana de Direitos Humanos e o seu papel central no 
Sistema Interamericano de Proteção dos Direitos Humanos, in O Sistema 
Interamericano de Direitos Humanos e o direito brasileiro (Luiz Flávio Gomes 
&, Flávia Piovesan eds., 2000), 56. 
196 Compare IACommHR Statute, Art. 19 (powers of IACommHR vis-à-vis 
States which are Parties to the ACHR) with Art. 20 (powers of IACommHR vis-
à-vis States which are not Parties to the ACHR). 
197 Cfr. Thomas Burgenthal & Douglass Cassel, The Future of the Inter-American 
Human Rights System, in El Futuro del Sistema Interamericano de Protection de los 
derechos humanos (Juan Mendez & Francisco Cox eds., 1998), 539. 
198 Cfr. IACommHR Statute, Art. 24 juncto IACommHR Regulation, Art. 51 
(procedure for petitioning the IACommHR claiming a human rights violations 
by a State which is not a Party to the ACHR). 
199 IACommHR Statute, Art. 20(b). 
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shaming’ might put some political pressure on the State under 
review to change its policies.200 
The differences in the institutional structure between the 
supranational human rights system binding Italy and the one 
binding the US directly affect the possibility for the individuals 
who allege that they have been subject to extraordinary renditions 
and who were not able to make their case in Italian or US fora – 
because of the assertion of a State secret privilege by the 
government trumping the possibility of domestic litigation – to 
obtain redress before a supranational body. Indeed, the catalogue 
of rights codified in the European and American human rights 
systems include a number of largely overlapping provisions 
which are of relevance for individuals who have been subject to 
extraordinary renditions – inter alia, by protecting a procedural 
right of access to court,201 prohibiting torture and inhumane 
treatment,202 and safeguarding to the right to liberty and respect 
for private life.203 Nevertheless, the pervasive mechanisms of 
adjudication operating in the framework of the ECHR appear to 
be more effective vis-à-vis the regional system binding the US. Yet, 
other dynamics beyond institutional design needs to be taken into 
account when evaluating the greater capacity of the European 
human rights architecture in filling possible gaps in the protection 
of individual rights at the domestic level.  
Also the role of a supranational court such as the ECtHR, in 
fact, is constrained by several substantive and procedural factors. 
To begin with, most rights protected under the ECHR are not 
absolute, and rather can be restricted by the Contracting Parties in 
the interest of national security, subject to respect for the principle 
                                                 
200 Steiner, Alston & Goodman (supra note 72), 1033; Goldman (supra note 195), 
887. 
201 Compare ECHR, Art. 6 (right to a fair trial) and Art. 13 (right to an effective 
remedy at the domestic level) with ADRDM Art. XVIII (right to a fair trial) and 
Art. XXVI (right to due process). 
202 Compare ECHR, Art. 2 (right to life) and Art. 3 (prohibition of torture and 
inhumane and degrading treatment) with ADRDM Art. I (right to life) and Art. 
XXV (right to humane treatment). 
203 Compare ECHR Art. 5 (prohibition of detention without trial) and Art. 8 
(protection of private life) with ADRDM Art. XXV (protection against arbitrary 
arrest) and Art. V (protection of private life). 
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of proportionality.204 In addition, Art. 15 ECHR affirms that “in 
times of war or public emergency threatening the life of the 
nation,”205 Signatory States may formally derogate from their 
ECHR obligations (save for the respect of the right to life, the 
prohibition of torture and of slavery) to the extent strictly required 
by the exigencies of the situation.206 Finally, the ECtHR has, over 
time, developed in its case law a specific doctrine – known as the 
margin of appreciation – which allows Contracting Parties to 
enjoy a certain discretion when their measures are subject to 
review.207 Although not applied systematically, this doctrine 
commands judicial restraint and de facto may leave to the 
Contracting Parties wide room for manoeuvre in national security 
matters beyond any oversight by the ECtHR.208 
Despite these constraints, however, the analysis of the case 
law demonstrates that the ECtHR has attempted to limit recourse 
by national governments to the State secret privilege, even in the 
                                                 
204 On the rise of proportionality analysis (also) in the jurisprudence of the 
ECtHR see Alec Stone Sweet & Jud Mathews, Proportionality, Balancing and 
Global Constitutionalism, 47 Columbia J. Transnat’l L. 1 (2008), 73, 75 and 
Giacinto della Cananea, Beyond the State: The Europeanization and Globalization of 
Procedural Administrative Law, in Studies on European Public Law (Luis Ortega 
Alvarez ed., 2005), 68. 
205 ECHR Art. 15. 
206 Cfr. e.g. ECtHR, Branningan and McBride v. United Kingdom (Applications No. 
14553/89 & 14554/89) [ECtHR], judgment of May 26, 1993 (holding that 
national authorities are in a better position than the ECtHR to decide on the 
existence of an emergency) but see also See Aksoy v. Turkey (Application No. 
21987/93) [ECtHR], judgment of July 3, 1996 (holding that the measures 
adopted under Art. 15 ECHR exceeded what was strictly required by the 
exigencies of the situation). In the literature cfr. then Eva Brems, The Margin of 
Appreciation in the Case-Law of the European Court of Human Rights, 56 Zeitschrift 
für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht (1996), 240 and Oren 
Gross & Fionnuala Ní Aoláin, From Discretion to Scrutiny: Revisiting the 
Application of the Margin of Appreciation Doctrine in the Context of Article 15 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights, 23 H. R. Quarterly (2001), 625. 
207 On the doctrine of the margin of appreciation more generally cfr. Howard 
Yourow, The Margin of Appreciation Doctrine in the Dynamics of European Human 
Rights Jurisprudence (1996); Palmina Tanzarella, Il margine di apprezzamento, in I 
diritti in Azione (Marta Cartabia ed., 2007), 143. 
208 Whether the margin of appreciation doctrine should considered as a positive 
feature of the ECHR system has been the object of debate: compare Eyal 
Benvenisti, Margin of Appreciation, Consensus and Universal Standards, 31 NYU J.  
Int’l L. & P. (1999), 843 and Paolo Carozza, Subsidiarity as a Structural Principle of 
International Human Rights Law, 97 Am. J. Int’l L. 1 (2003), 38. 
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field of counter-terrorism.209 Starting with Tinnelley & Sons Ltd v. 
UK,210 in a series of cases (mainly relating to Northern Ireland 
anti-terrorism legislation) the ECtHR has made clear that the 
assertion of the State secret privilege (there, to prevent litigation in 
cases of discrimination in employment and public procurements) 
was not compatible with the right of access to court enshrined in 
Art. 6 ECHR.211 Recently, in Devenney v. UK the ECtHR has 
formulated once again the proportionality test that it adopts in 
these cases. The ECtHR in fact, “accepts that the protection of 
national security is a legitimate aim which may entail limitations 
on the right of access to a court, including withholding 
information for the purposes of security”212, but preserves for 
itself the power “to consider whether there is a reasonable 
relationship of proportionality between the concerns for the 
protection of national security invoked by the authorities and the 
impact which the means they employed to this end had on the 
applicant’s right of access to a court or tribunal.”213 
In balancing the competing interests in the case at hand, the 
ECtHR considered as relevant the fact that, because of the 
assertion of the State secret privilege in the domestic proceedings, 
“there could be no independent scrutiny whatsoever”214 of the 
plaintiff’s claim (of discrimination on the basis of political or 
religious belief) and thus the applicant was “unable to challenge 
the dismissal or pursue any potential claim for pecuniary loss.”215 
                                                 
209 In other fields cfr. Kenedi v Hungary (Application No. 31475/05) [ECtHR] 
judgment of May 26, 2009 (finding a violation of Art. 6 ECHR because of the 
refusal of Hungary to disclose State secret documents to plaintiff despite court 
order); Matyjek v. Poland (Application No. 38184/03) [ECtHR] judgment of Sept. 
24, 2007 (finding violation of Art. 6 ECHR because of the refusal of Poland to 
disclose State secret documents in lustration proceedings). 
210 Tinnelly & Sons Ltd. et al. v. UK (Application No. 20390/92) [ECtHR] 
judgment of July 10, 1998. 
211 Cfr. Golder v. United Kingdom (Application No. 4451/70) [ECtHR] judgment 
of Feb. 21, 1975 (interpreting Art. 6 ECHR as including a right to access to court) 
– on which see Carol Harlow, Access to Justice as a Human Right: the European 
Convention and the European Union, in The EU and Human Rights (Philip Alston 
ed., 1999), 190. 
212 Devenney v. UK (Application No. 24265/94) [ECtHR] judgment of June 19, 
2002, at §26. 
213 Id., at §26. 
214 Id., at §25. 
215 Id., at §28. 
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The ECtHR therefore concluded that the severity of the restriction 
imposed on the right to access a court – unmitigated by any other 
available mechanisms of complaint – “was tantamount to removal 
of the court’s jurisdiction by executive ipse dixit”216 and was in 
violation of the ECHR and it thus awarded pecuniary damages to 
the applicant. By reviewing the action of a Contracting Party 
through the prism of the procedural right of access to justice, these 
decisions of the ECtHR, in the end, suggest a confident role by the 
European supranational judiciary when national executives bar 
domestic litigation through the invocation of a State secret 
privilege.217 
In light of the general institutional and jurisprudential 
capacity of supranational institutions in Europe and, conversely, 
in the US to ensure an additional forum to redress human rights 
violations shielded at the domestic level by the application of the 
State secret privilege, it is now possible to draw some cautionary 
remarks on the role of supranational courts in the cases of Mr. 
Abu Omar and Mr. El-Masri under review here. Individuals who 
were subject to extraordinary renditions can lodge an application 
before the ECtHR or the IACommHR, after the exhaustion of 
domestic remedies, alleging a violation of their fundamental 
rights.218 Whereas the review of the IACommHR would be 
extremely limited, however, it seems plausible to argue that 
applicants would obtain a fair chance of advancing their claims 
before the ECtHR. In the case of Mr. El-Masri, since his action was 
dismissed entirely at the domestic level, an application to the 
ECtHR could well directly claim a violation of the procedural 
right of access to justice and of the right to a fair trial – like in the 
Tinnelley and Devenney cases – and (only) indirectly allege a 
limitation inter alia of the substantive provisions prohibiting 
torture and inhumane and degrading treatments.219 
In the case of Mr. Abu Omar, on the contrary, since the 
criminal trial was not entirely trumped by the acknowledgment of 
a State secret privilege by the CCost, any possible recourse to the 
                                                 
216 Id. Cfr. also Tinnelly, at §77. 
217 Cfr. also Iain Cameron, National Security and the European Convention on 
Human Rights (2000). 
218 Cfr. text accompanying supra nt. 189 & 198. 
219 Of course, the US are not a party to the ECHR, so the hypothesis presented 
here is advance in the abstract. But cfr. infra text accompanying nt. 224. 
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ECtHR would likely have to follow a different path. First of all, 
domestic venues of appeal would have to be exhausted with a 
final decision on the case by the Criminal division of the Corte di 
Cassazione – Italy’s Supreme Court.220 Secondly, whereas the 
public prosecutors would be unqualified to petition the ECtHR, 
Mr. Abu Omar would have to lodge a formal complaint221 and 
either claim (and demonstrate) that his request for compensatory 
damages had not been adequately satisfied at the domestic level222 
or assert, as an alternative, that his allegations of torture and 
inhumane treatment were not fully investigated and prosecuted at 
the domestic level and that Italy had therefore failed to comply 
with its ECHR obligations.223 In the first case, Mr. Abu Omar’s 
action (provided it is admissible) could be based on the procedural 
right of access to court, whereas in the second case it would have 
to be based on the substantive provision of the ECHR prohibiting 
torture, inhumane treatment and detention without trial. 
Be that as it may, although, at the moment, the possibility 
for Mr. Abu Omar to bring an action before the ECtHR seems 
mere speculation, it is remarkable that, instead, the scenario 
concerning Mr. El-Masri is coming into being. On 21 September 
2009, in fact, Mr. El-Masri filed an application before the ECtHR 
against Macedonia (who is a party to the ECHR) asking the 
ECtHR to find that Macedonia, by unlawfully abducting him and 
transferring to CIA custody, had violated the prohibition of 
torture and inhumane treatment, his right to life, his right not to 
be detained without trial, his right of access to court and to a fair 
trial and his right to respect for private life.224 Mr. El-Masri alleged 
that Macedonia had failed to respond to his requests to open a 
criminal investigation to inquiry about his allegation and that the 
statute of limitations prevented any such initiative in the future. 
                                                 
220 Cfr. supra text accompanying nt. 56. 
221 Cfr. supra text accompanying nt. 186. 
222 Cfr. supra nt. 58. 
223 Cfr. also Messineo (supra note 5), 1033 who explains that the investigations 
of the public prosecutors has only focused on the crime of abduction and not on 
the crime of (complicity in) torture and inhumane treatments that Mr. Abu 
Omar has suffered as a consequence of his extraordinary rendition to Egypt. 
224 Cfr. Application to the ECtHR, No. 39630/09, El-Masri v. Macedonia (available 
at: 
http://www.soros.org/initiatives/justice/litigation/macedonia/Application-
Public-Version-20090921.pdf (last accessed June 10, 2011)). 
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He also stated that a civil action for damages was pending before 
the Macedonian courts but that this process was not capable of 
providing an effective remedy for the violation of his ECHR 
rights225 and asked the ECtHR to award him pecuniary and non-
pecuniary damages. On 14 June 2010, with a noteworthy 
decision,226 the ECtHR declared El-Masri’s application as 
admissible and scheduled hearings to decide the case on the 
merits.227 
A final pronouncement by the ECtHR reviewing the 
compatibility with the ECHR principles of the extraordinary 
rendition of Mr. El-Masri is therefore to be expected in the near 
future. This state of affairs starkly contrasts with what is going on, 
instead, within the Inter-American human rights system. After the 
                                                 
225 Cfr. e.g. Assenov v. Bulgaria (Application No. 24760/94) [ECtHR] judgment 
Oct. 28, 1998 (holding that victim who has exhausted remedies within the 
domestic criminal system should not pursue remedies before the domestic civil 
system before being able to sue the ECtHR); Dzeladinov et al. v. Macedonia 
(Application No. 1325202) [ECtHR] decision of admissibility March 6, 2007 
(idem). 
226 To appreciate the importance of the admissibility decision of the ECHR it 
may be noticed that only a very limited number of applications lodged before 
the ECtHR are actually declared admissible and considered in the merit. The 
Annual Report of for the Year 2009 (2010), 146 (available at: 
http://www.echr.coe.int/NR/rdonlyres/C25277F5-BCAE-4401-BC9B-
F58D015E4D54/0/Annual_Report_2009_Final.pdf (last accessed June 10, 2011)) 
states that of the 35,460 applications received by the ECtHR in 2009, only 2,395 
were considered admissible for a judgment of the merit (this means that less 
than 7% of the case are declared admissible). Note further that with the 
entrance into force of the 14th additional Protocol to the ECHR on June 1, 2010 
conditions for admissibility of the applications have been tightened with the 
expectation to reduce even further the amount of cases to be decided on the 
merit by the ECtHR and henceforth to address the ever growing backlog of 
cases that is threatening the effective functioning of the ECtHR. Cfr. Palmina 
Tanzarella, Il futuro della Corte europea dei diritti dopo il Protocollo XIV, Quaderni 
Costituzionali (2010), 423. 
227 El-Masri v. Macedonia (Application No. 39630/09) [ECtHR] decision of 
admissibility June 14, 2010. Cfr. Open Society Justice Initiative, Press release 
June 14, 2010 (available at 
http://www.soros.org/initiatives/justice/focus/national-security/news/el-
masri-rendition-20100614 (last accessed June 10, 2011)). On Oct. 8, 2010, the 
ECtHR communicated the decision to the Macedonian government asking it to 
reply to specific questions. Cfr. Open Society Justice Initiative, Press release Oct. 
14, 2010 (available at http://www.soros.org/initiatives/justice/focus/national-
security/news/el-masri-european-court-20101014 (last accessed June 10, 2011)). 
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exhaustion of his US venues of redress, on 9 April 2008 Mr. El-
Masri petitioned the IACommHR alleging that the US had 
violated inter alia his right to life, to personality and to protection 
against arbitrary arrest, as recognized in the ADRDM.228 Because 
of the limited powers of the IACommHR vis-à-vis the US, 
however, Mr. El-Masri could only plea the IACommHR to 
investigate the facts, declare that the US is responsible for the 
violation of the ADRDM, and ask it to recommend adequate and 
effective remedies for addressing the violation of his rights, 
including requesting that the US government and those directly 
responsible for Mr. El-Masri’s extraordinary rendition publicly 
acknowledge such involvement and publicly apologize. More than 
two years later, however, despite the decision of the IACommHR 
to accept the petition,229 the proceedings have not moved forward 
since the US has refused to cooperate.230  
In conclusion, as this Section suggests, a multilevel 
architecture for the protection of fundamental rights such as that 
existing in Europe today can have several advantages.231 A 
supranational court such as the ECtHR can play a role in ensuring 
effective protection of fundamental rights, even where for reasons 
of national security – as invoked by national governments through 
the State secret privilege –municipal courts have been forced to 
step back from litigation involving cases of extraordinary 
rendition, leaving gaps at the domestic level. On this ground, 
there seems to be a remarkable difference between the regional 
                                                 
228 Cfr. Petition to the IACommHR, No. 419-08, El-Masri v. US, April 9, 2008 
(available at: 
http://www.aclu.org/files/pdfs/safefree/elmasri_iachr_20080409.pdf (last 
accessed June 10, 2011)). 
229 El-Masri v. US (Petition No. 419-08) [IACommHR] decision of admissibility 
Aug. 27, 2009. Cfr. American Civil Liberties Union, Press release Aug. 27, 2009 
(available at http://www.aclu.org/human-rights_national-
security/international-tribunal-takes-case-innocent-victim-cia-extraordinary-r 
(last accessed June 10, 2011)). 
230 Cfr. Additional Information from Petitioner, No. 419-08, El-Masri v. US, July 
27, 2010 (available at: http://www.aclu.org/files/assets/P-419-
08_Petitioners_Additional_Information.pdf (last accessed June 10, 2011)). 
231 Cfr. Marta Cartabia, Europe and Rights: Taking Dialogue Seriously, 5 Eu. Const. 
L. Rev. (2009), 5 and Aida Torres Pérez, Conflict of Rights in the Eurpean Union 
(2009). For further reference to the literature cfr. then Federico Fabbrini, The 
European Multilevel System for the Protection of Fundamental Rights: A ‘Neo-
Federalist’ Perspective, Jean Monnet Working Paper 14 (2010). 
Fabbrini – Extraordinary Renditions 
366 
 
human rights institutions supervising the action of Italy and the 
US: the Inter-American human rights systems binding the US is 
very weak compared to the substantive obligations and the 
adjudicatory and enforcement mechanisms established by the 
ECHR. On the other hand, as remarked above, the capacity of the 
ECtHR to review the action of national executives should not be 
overestimated, not least because the ECtHR can only award 
pecuniary damages when it finds a violation of the ECHR. 
Nevertheless, the precedents of the ECtHR in cases of States’ 
abuse of the secrecy privilege, as well as the recent decision of the 
ECtHR to admit the application of Mr. El-Masri shed some 
cautionary optimism about the forthcoming litigation at the 
supranational level of claims of extraordinary renditions. 
 
 
 6. Conclusion 
The purpose of this article was to analyze the application of 
the State secret privilege in litigations concerning cases of 
extraordinary renditions. With several caveats, the article has 
argued that, despite the gravity of the allegations of human rights 
violations made by the individuals who were subjected to 
extraordinary renditions, a common pattern of judicial retreat 
emerges both in Italy and in the US whenever the government 
invokes a State secret. In the Abu Omar case, in Italy, the CCost 
ruled that the government had legitimately asserted a State secret 
privilege barring public prosecutors and ordinary judges from 
utilizing the evidence on the relationship between the CIA and the 
Italian intelligence which was essential in proving the criminal 
liability of the Italian officers involved in the abduction of Mr. 
Abu Omar. In the El-Masri case (and, more recently, in Mohamed), 
US federal courts blocked the action for civil liability that Mr. El-
Masri had commenced, recognizing that the State secrecy privilege 
invoked by the executive branch was valid and commanded tout 
court dismissal of the case.  
The comparative constitutional analysis highlights that a 
similar approach of judicial deference vis-à-vis the executive 
branch in matters of State secret privilege prevails in both 
countries. The consequence of such a broad operation of the State 
privilege, however, is the impossibility for individuals allegedly 
subjected to extraordinary renditions to obtain justice through 
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redress before domestic courts. How can this troubling trend be 
counteracted? This article has offered a nuanced answer. In a 
remarkably convergent mode, both the US and Italian courts have 
invited legislatures to exercise greater scrutiny over the action of 
the executive branch and to provide redress against human rights 
violations. The analysis has demonstrated, however, that both in 
parliamentary and in separation of powers systems the 
willingness and the ability of Parliament or Congress to check the 
executive might be limited for political and institutional reasons. 
In fact, the cases of Mr. Abu Omar and Mr. El-Masri themselves 
prove how ill-fated the judicial call for legislative intervention 
might sometimes be.  
As an alternative venue of redress, the article has examined 
the function of supranational courts. The existence of a multilevel 
system for the protection of fundamental rights, in fact, may help 
fill the lacunae of the domestic legal systems and ensure that 
individuals who have suffered infringements of their rights (e.g. 
by being subject to extraordinary rendition) have an additional 
forum in which to advance their claims. From this point of view, 
however, a major difference exists between Italy and the US: 
whereas Italy, as all other European countries, is subject to an 
external and compelling review exercised by the ECtHR, the US is 
not yet party to the ACHR and cannot be sued before the IACtHR. 
Petitions can still be brought by private persons before the 
IACommHR, but, as the case of Mr. El-Masri clearly proves, this 
process is hardly as effective as the one provided by the ECHR. 
Nevertheless, the role of a supranational court such as the ECtHR 
should not be overestimated. A number of substantive and 
jurisprudential factors constrain its action and might diminish its 
capacity to cope alone with the function of overseeing State 
actions and adjudicating human rights violations. 
In the end, it is reasonable to argue that stronger 
constitutional checks and balances and more effective review by 
supranational institutions are not mutually exclusive. Rather they 
can, and should, complement each other to ensure that 
fundamental rights are not unduly sacrificed for reasons of 
national security. The examples addressed in this article, on the 
unsuccessful attempt of Mr. Abu Omar and Mr. El-Masri to obtain 
a domestic remedy for the extraordinary rendition they have 
suffered, show how problematic the executive’s assertion of a 
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State secret privilege can be when it is left unchecked and 
unreviewed. Domestic courts, domestic legislatures and 
supranational institutions have all a role to play in order to ensure 
that individuals who allege that they have experienced outrageous 
violations of their rights by the hand of our governments are not 
left without a remedy, simply because of the executive say so. The 
fight against terrorism surely requires the handling of confidential 
information. But the rule of law demands that fundamental rights 
be safeguarded before the “arcana imperii.”232  
 
 
  
                                                 
232 Tacitus, Annales, Liber Ii – 36. 
